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A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition
A. John Radsan ∗
He is a foot soldier in a clash between radical Islam and the
1
United States that exploded on September 11, 2001. With respect
2
and admiration, his followers call him Abu Omar. He is an Islamic
3
cleric from Egypt who was granted political asylum in Italy in 1997.
There, in a Milan mosque for all to see and hear, he exhorted radi4
cals to wage an outward jihad against the infidels.
Governmental authorities in Europe and America are at a loss
about what to do with people like Abu Omar—whether to treat him
as a law enforcement problem, a military problem, an intelligence
problem, or as no problem at all. Regardless of the kind of problem
Abu Omar represents, the Italian security services and the intelligence services from allied countries had, at a minimum, taken notice
of him. Some intelligence services even suspected Abu Omar of being a European affiliate for Ansar al-Islam, a terrorist group that has
5
conducted anti-Western operations in Iraq.
On February 17, 2003, some people took matters into their own
6
hands. Without notice to Abu Omar and without a judicial or ad∗
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ministrative hearing, these people snatched him from the streets of
Milan, dumped him into a van, and whisked him on a private plane
7
back to his native Egypt for less-than-friendly discussions. Although
some observers alleged that the dark hand of the Central Intelligence
8
Agency (“the CIA”) was behind Abu Omar’s “snatch,” those allegations are unproven. Whether Italian authorities participated in or
were aware of Abu Omar’s abduction and the extent of American in9
volvement still remain a mystery. One Italian prosecutor, however,
was unimpeded by the mysterious circumstances of Abu Omar’s abduction. Armed with some evidence of American involvement, this
prosecutor issued over twenty arrest warrants against United States
10
After that, the
operatives for taking Abu Omar outside of Italy.
prosecutor charged Italian intelligence officials for complicity in the
11
abduction.
Inevitably, the Italian prosecutor’s search for the truth will be
thwarted because it is unlikely that Americans indicted in the case will
ever face charges in Italy. The United States will not voluntarily surrender its officials through extradition, and it is unlikely that Italian
authorities will transfer them through irregular means. Apparently,
an abduction is acceptable for a radical cleric, but not for American
officials.
The abduction of foreign nationals in foreign nations by United
States agents is not something new. Such abductions occurred before
12
September 11. But before September 11, the purpose of a snatch
was most often to bring an accused back to the United States for
prosecution—not to transport him or her to another nation for inter13
rogation without charges. Before September 11, the suspect even7

Id.
Stephen Grey & Don Van Natta, 13 With the C.I.A. Sought by Italy in a Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at A1.
9
See Dana Priest, Italy Knew About Plan to Grab Suspect; CIA Officials Cite Briefing in
2003, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at A1; Craig Whitlock, Italy Denies Complicity in Alleged CIA Action, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at A14.
10
See Italy Seeks Arrests in Kidnapping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A5.
11
Stephen Grey & Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy Arrests 2 in Kidnapping of Imam in ’03,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A1.
12
For example, in 1987, Lebanese terrorist suspect Fawaz Younis was rendered
into U.S. custody after being lured onto a private yacht where F.B.I. agents captured
him as the vessel entered international waters. See Elaine Sciolino, Friend Led Terror
Suspect to F.B.I., Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1987, at 3.
13
For instance, plans to snatch Osama Bin Laden in Sudan in 1996 were not carried out because there was no criminal indictment against him. See THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 110 n.7 (2004). A notable snatch was the case of
Mir Amal Kasi. After he was snatched in Afghanistan, he was rendered back to the
8
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tually appeared in a public courtroom to face criminal charges. Since
14
then, snatches have changed and increased in frequency. Now, the
purpose to a snatch is most often to gather intelligence by taking the
15
suspect to a secret location.
For the interrogation of terrorism suspects, secret locations outside the United States have several advantages for American authorities. First, other terrorists are less able to liberate their captured colleagues from secret locations than from known sites on the current
battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, the locations may have
more available interrogators who speak the suspect’s native language.
Third, the locations may be more convenient, in terms of restaurants
and hotels, for the interrogation teams. Finally, according to the
surprisingly candid statements of one CIA official, officials in other
countries might use interrogation techniques that the United States
16
does not, may not, and should not use.
The number of snatches (or “renditions”) is much smaller than
the number of enemy prisoners of war (“POWs”) Americans have
17
taken in conventional wars. This is not to say, however, that the
United States to face murder charges in Virginia for killing two CIA employees as
they were about to drive into headquarters in Langley, Virginia. See The Threat to the
United States Posed by Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Louis J.
Freeh, Dir. of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1999_hr/990204-freehct2.htm. Kasi was convicted
in 1997 and executed for his crime in November 2002. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Pakistan: In flagrante delicto, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A21.
14
Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106–07.
15
See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13.
16
See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1.
17
A senior intelligence official said there had been fewer than 100 detainees in
the CIA program since its inception shortly after the September 11 attacks. Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Threats and Responses: The Overview; The President Moves 14 Held in Secret
to Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A1. During World War II the United
States accepted hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war from the British. John
Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1219–20 (2004) (citing
GEORGE G. LEWIS & JOHN MEWHA, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 20-213: HISTORY
OF PRISONER OF WAR UTILIZATION BY THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1776–1945 83 (1955)).
In August of 1942, the United States accepted 150,000 prisoners of war from the British and in November of that year accepted another 25,000. Id. During World War II,
700,000 prisoners of war were transferred by the United States to the control of other
countries, such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Id. at 1218. See also Arnold P.
Kramer, German Prisoners of War (2001), http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/
handbook/online/articles/GG/qug1.html (at the end of World War II there were
425,000 enemy prisoners in 511 main and branch camps throughout the United
States); John Ray Skates, MISS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y, German Prisoners of War in Mississippi,
1943–1946
(2004),
http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/features/feature20/
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number of renditions is insignificant. Rather, this is to say that rendition is something different from traditional warfare. For instance,
unlike prisoners of war who are monitored by the International
18
Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations, terrorism suspects who have been rendered remain in the shadows—outside traditional legal process. In effect, rendition is the hidden domain of intelligence services, not the open realm of courts, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers.
Although rendition is designed to stay out of the news, the pesky
media have reported that the United States has rendered over 100
people by irregular means to such places as Syria, Afghanistan, and
19
Egypt since September 11. Through persistence, the media have
pried loose some details on rendition. Those details invite an analysis
of the legality of irregular rendition under American law.
germanprisonersofwar.html (in July, 1943, the United States and Great Britain took
275,000 German and Italian soldiers into captivity).
18
“The ICRC monitors and assesses detainees’ conditions of detention and
treatment by sending trained staff to visit places of detention, talk with the authorities concerned, hold private interviews with detainees/prisoners and prepare an
overall analysis of their findings. ICRC findings, assessments and related recommendations are discussed with the authorities at the appropriate levels.” INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF RED CROSS, ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, Jan. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList125/1C6C94A33EA24A59C1257
18100393DBA. “In 2005, the ICRC visited more than 500,000 prisoners of war and
detainees in more than 80 countries.” International Committee of the Red Cross,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/ICRC_Activities?OpenDocume
nt (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
“Visiting people deprived of their freedom in connection with conflict
is a core protection task of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). . . . During the First and Second World Wars, countless
numbers of prisoners—whether American, British, French, German or
of other nationalities—benefited from these visits, and from the dispatch of parcels and messages from home. This work continues today,
for example through the visits to prisoners of war taken in the conflict
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or in the Western Sahara.”
International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Visits to Persons Deprived of their Freedom: An Internationally Mandated Task, Implemented Worldwide, http://www.icrc.org/
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JRME?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 10, 2006).
19
See Mayer, supra note 14, at 107. Citizens of various countries have allegedly
been rendered to many different places. See, e.g., id. (Mahar Arar, a Canadian citizen, was allegedly rendered from New York’s JFK Airport to Syria); Whitlock, supra
note 1 (German citizen Khaled El-Masri was allegedly rendered from the Balkans to
Afghanistan, and returned four months later when captors realized he was not the
correct al-Qaeda suspect); Dana Priest, Help From France Key in Covert Operations,
WASH. POST, July 3, 2005, at A1 (German suspected of being European al-Qaeda
leader held in France as he was about to switch planes); Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 11
(Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian-born Australian, was rendered from Pakistan to
Egypt, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, and eventually was released).
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The Bush Administration has not used rendition on American
citizens accused of terrorism. For them, the criminal justice system
remains a primary mode of detention. Although two American citizens, Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, were held in military brigs as “enemy combatants” in a “global struggle on terror,” American renditions have so far only been conducted on non-U.S. citizens.
But whatever the scope of the rendition program or the nationality of the person rendered, each rendition is significant to the person transferred, and to his family, friends, and acquaintances. For
this reason, rendition should be subject to scrutiny. Each rendition
has the potential to be a case of mistaken identity or a false accusation. Each rendition takes us farther away from the checks and balances of the criminal justice system and into the shadows of black operations and secret sites. Perhaps for these reasons, another former
CIA official, less in step with the prevailing sentiment at the CIA, has
20
called the rendition program “an abomination.”
This Article attempts to answer three aspects to one basic question about rendition. First, may the United States, while respecting
and complying with the rule of law, engage in snatches or renditions?
Second, may the United States take a person suspected of being involved in terrorism from another jurisdiction with (or without) that
jurisdiction’s consent and transfer him to a third jurisdiction for interrogation? Finally, may the United States do what the media alleged it did to Abu Omar?
This Article does not, however, discuss in depth nor formulate
an opinion on at least four other issues concerning rendition. First,
other than by mentioning the debate, I do not spend much time as21
sessing the policy arguments for and against rendition. Second, I
stay neutral as to whether the President, if necessary, may use commander-in-chief powers to overrule any domestic or international law
that would otherwise stand in the way of irregular rendition as a part
22
of the strategy against terrorism. Third, I do not fully explore the
differences in three levels of interrogation: (1) methods that are acceptably used on criminal defendants; (2) methods that constitute
cruel, inhuman, and degrading (“CID”) treatment; and (3) methods
20

Mayer, supra note 14, at 106–07.
Thus, I am not opposed to a policy that would preclude rendition because of
the perceived damage it causes to our self-image and to our international reputation.
22
Compare Yoo, supra note 17 (arguing that the President’s commander-in-chief
powers can trump certain provisions of treaties such as the Convention Against Torture), with Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (arguing that the President does not have the power
unilaterally to violate treaties).
21
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that constitute torture. I accept prevailing views and common sense
on what constitutes an affront to due process and on what constitutes
CID and torture. Fourth, even though the Bush Administration has
sometimes defined torture in the most restricted way, for present
purposes, I take at face value their pronouncements that terrorism
suspects are not tortured in United States custody and are not trans23
ferred to other jurisdictions to be tortured. Even so, mindful of potential evidence that rebuts the Bush Administration’s claims, I dare
to enter a gray zone to determine whether irregular rendition can be
made regular and legal through assurances from third countries—
Egypt in Abu Omar’s case—and through monitoring and oversight by
American officials on the conditions and treatment of rendered suspects.
As much as possible, I try to leave rhetoric behind to delve into
questions of law. The practice of rendition is something that goes
beyond political parties. Readers who are extremely troubled by the
policy of rendition may view my analysis as a retrospective on the
Bush Administration’s past practices. They may describe my project
as history. Less troubled readers, on the other hand, may be willing
to proceed by leaving policy to policymakers and legal analysis to lawyers.
Respecting academic conventions on form, I proceed with deliberate pace through several movements in this Article. Part I adds
precision to the use of the term “irregular rendition,” explaining my
preference for this term over “snatches” and “extraordinary rendi24
tion.” Part II assesses domestic and international laws that affect ir25
Here, the United Nations Convention Against
regular rendition.
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Pun26
ishment (“CAT”) is of particular importance. While the term irregular rendition usually refers to situations in which suspects are
sent to countries with questionable human rights records, I will show
that some irregular renditions are clearly legal. For example, not
even Human Rights Watch should complain if the United States renders a Swiss citizen captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan back to
Switzerland. Part III assesses various types of assurances that the

23
U.S. Department of State, Rice Says United States Does Not Torture Terrorists (Dec.
5, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2005/Dec/05-762606.html.
24
See infra Part I.
25
See infra Part II.
26
G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, ¶ 39, U.N. GAOR, 39th Session, Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10. 1984), available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
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United States could obtain from the receiving countries before con27
ducting an irregular rendition. The assurances could be either oral
or written and could come from heads of state, through diplomatic
channels of an ambassador or a foreign minister, or from intelligence
officials. Part IV assesses the role that post-transfer monitoring and
28
oversight could play in making close calls on irregular rendition.
Part V, working within what I believe is an intelligence paradigm, lays
out several scenarios in which a suspect is rendered to another juris29
diction. To correlate with the analysis from Part II, some countries
mentioned as recipients of rendered suspects are divided into three
groups. Most of the attention is thus focused on countries to which
rendition would be permissible but potentially problematic.
My conclusion is that with care and caution irregular rendition
can be carried out under the law. The way I reach this conclusion
may disappoint leading voices in the broader debate about counterterrorism. At one end, those who have a broad view of executive
power might accuse me of micro-management. At the other end,
those who trumpet individual liberty might accuse me of heartlessness far worse than micro-management. Such accusations from both
sides of the debate should serve as a reassurance, however, that I have
made some progress in finding a reasonable position in the middle
on a thorny issue in counter-terrorism.
I.

DEFINITIONS

“Snatch” is a colloquial term used to describe the process of
bringing people into the American rendition program. It has been
30
defined as “to seize by a sudden or hasty grasp” or “to kidnap.” This
term is often used by law enforcement officers and intelligence officials. For instance, a former counter-terrorism czar, Richard Clarke,
31
uses the term. I try to avoid the term as a reminder of the seriousness of our subject: a government’s decision to put a human being in
a cage and to transfer him to another cage for rough treatment.
Similarly, I avoid the term “extraordinary rendition” because it has
become popular in the media as a symbol for torture and other
32
wrongdoing.
27

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
29
See infra Part V.
30
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1807 (3d ed. 2001).
31
See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 143 (2004).
32
Other academic authors also prefer the term irregular over extraordinary. See,
e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 851 (3d ed. 2002) (“Rendition is
28
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“Regular” is an appropriate term for starting a neutral analysis of
American practices. This term has been defined as “evenly or uni33
formly arranged” and “characterized by . . . uniform procedure.” By
starting with this term, I easily establish a duality between regular and
irregular practices. Irregular rendition is separate from transfers
pursuant to a treaty. Renditions based on a treaty are known as extraditions. They involve the courts and the foreign ministries in sending and receiving countries, and deserve the label of “regular rendi34
tion.” In contrast, “irregular renditions” are not based on a treaty,
and involve the secret transfer of a foreign terrorism suspect from
United States custody to other countries for detention and interrogation. These transfers may or may not be done by a written agreement.
I focus on irregular renditions in which the United States is the
country that sends terrorism suspects to another country. In theory
and in practice, there are many other scenarios of irregular rendition: cases in which the United States is the receiving country or cases
when rendition occurs between two other countries. The media attention on American practices—and the focus of this Article—should
not lead to a skewed conclusion that the United States is the only
country in the rendition business. Renditions by other countries
have been scrutinized by the European Court of Human Rights and
35
by human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch. Sweden, for example, has been criticized for denying asylum to two putative terrorists, Ahmed Agiza and Muhammed Zery, and for expelling
36
them to Egypt. However, no matter what countries are involved,
what terms are used, or what safeguards are put in place, critics of irregular rendition should understand that we move forward with dark
hoods over our heads. The hoods represent the possibility that, despite our best efforts, we may not have all the facts. What we are doing might be immoral or based on mistaken identity. The govern-

irregular when [an] individual [] [is] taken from one country to another as a criminal suspect against [his] free will and without consent of the country from which [he
is] taken.” (citing JORDAN PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 436 (2d ed.
2000)).
33
WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 30, at 1624.
34
For a discussion of international extradition, see 31A AM. JUR. 2D Extradition §
12 (2005).
35
See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News: Torture and Abuse,
http://www.hrw.org/doc/?t=torture (last visited August 24, 2006).
36
Craig Whitlock, New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action; Probe Finds ‘Rendition’ of Terror Suspects Illegal, WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at A1.
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ment does not want us to know everything, and perfection is for
higher powers.
Whether the topic is irregular rendition or something else, national security is not the only area that deals with ambiguity in American law. Analogous to the difficulties that American officials face in
deciding whether and how to render terrorism suspects are the difficulties that American executives face in deciding how to sell their
products and services around the world. The Iranian trade sanctions,
for example, prevent Halliburton from selling petroleum products to
37
Iran.
Nothing prevents Halliburton, however, from selling such
products to France. Yet, Halliburton may not sell to a French company if there is a strong likelihood that those products will, in turn,
38
be sold to Iran. This would be an illegal end-run around the Iranian sanctions. In the corporate sphere, Halliburton protects itself
from liability by conducting “due diligence,” seeking oral and written
39
assurances, and with monitoring and oversight. In the intelligence
sphere, even though officials at the CIA do not necessarily label their
practices “due diligence,” they protect themselves from liability in the
same manner.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Commander-in-Chief Powers
The media have revealed, in part, the Bush Administration’s
40
practice of irregular rendition. Only a small group of American of-

37
See 15 C.F.R. § 746.7 (2006); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FOREIGN ASSETS
CONTROL REGULATIONS FOR EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS 20 (2006), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulations/t11facei.pdf
(“[G]oods, technology . . . or services may not be exported, reexported, sold or supplied, directly or indirectly, from the United States . . . to Iran.”).
38
See 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2006) (export not permitted if person has “knowledge
or reason to know” that export would be “directly or indirectly supplied, transshipped, or reexported exclusively or predominately to Iran”); see 50 U.S.C.S. § 1705
(LexisNexis 2006) (placing civil penalties on individuals and companies who “knowingly participate[]” in a violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA)); United States v. Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158, 1170 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding
that defendant willfully violated IEEPA by having knowledge that his Swiss customer
might forward military aircraft parts to Iran).
39
Federal export regulations of certain types of technology and software explicitly require a “written assurance . . . in the form of a letter or any other written communication.” 15 C.F.R. § 740.6(a)(3) (2006).
40
See Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 2005, at A1; Dana Priest, CIA, White House Defend Transfers of Terror Suspects,
WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2005, at A7; Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects
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ficials inside “compartments” of classified information, however,
41
knows the full truth about irregular rendition. The rhetoric from
the President and his advisors makes clear that they do not believe
42
“quaint” legal theories should impede getting tough with terrorists.
For example, about a year after September 11, a top CIA official,
Cofer Black, thrust his chin out and proudly stated: “[t]here was ‘be43
fore’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11. After 9/11, the gloves came off.” That
statement was as much fact as provocation. At less candid moments,
apologists for the administration could argue that irregular rendition
moves suspects to safer locations for interrogation and puts the suspects closer to interrogators who speak their language and understand their culture. Nonetheless, the popular perception, created by
the candor of Cofer Black and others, is that suspects are rendered to
locations where there are not so many checks on aggressive interrogation—to places where the gloves more easily come off.
To learn much of anything about the rendition program is a
struggle. Those without clearances are left to speculate and infer.
Although it is fair to speculate that the Bush Administration only embarked on its rendition policy or made specific rendition decisions
after receiving legal guidance from lawyers with access to the classified facts, nothing has been revealed to the public. That is, unlike
the infamous “torture” memo of August 2002 concerning interrogation practices, memoranda and letters from the Office of Legal
Counsel on irregular rendition, if any exist, have not leaked to the
44
public.
Doubted, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A1; Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of
U.S. Interrogation, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at A1.
41
Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30,
2005, at A1.
42
See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on the
Geneva Conventions and Prisoners of War to George W. Bush, the President of the
United States, 2–3 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/
4999148/site/newsweek (arguing that the need for flexibility in the war on terror
trumps traditional reasons for applying the Geneva Conventions to al-Qaeda and
Taliban prisoners).
43
Investigation of September 11 Failures: Hearing Before a Joint Session of the Senate and
House Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Cofer Black, Dir. of
the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center), available at 2002 WL 31151504; see also John
Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff, The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24,
2004, 1, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989436/site/newsweek/.
44
See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to George W.
Bush, the President of the United States 1 (Aug 1, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Torture Memorandum]; Dana Priest
& R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8,
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In search of details about the rendition program, I write outside
the in camera setting of the official analysis. I cannot assess all the official arguments because I am not privy to them. Similarly, lawyers in
the Bush Administration cannot comment on my analysis because of
their obligations to keep the confidences of their client. Therefore,
the current officials and this former official are on parallel tracks. As
citizens, we should hope that their analysis exceeds what I have done,
that they too have been honest in dealing with the difficult questions.
For a glimpse into the official guidance, one can infer from the
academic comments that former advisers have made. For instance,
Professor John Yoo, since leaving the Bush Administration as a key
adviser, has argued that no law, not even the CAT, stands in the way
45
of irregular rendition. Professor Yoo argues that nothing prevents
the United States from taking control of a terrorism suspect in a
country outside the United States and rendering the suspect to an46
His argument contains
other country outside the United States.
several strands. First, whatever gets in the way of the executive’s use
of irregular rendition in transferring terrorists constitutes an unconstitutional interference with the President’s commander-in-chief
47
Second, the CAT is not selfpowers during an armed conflict.
48
executing. Third, even if the CAT were self-executing, it only ap49
plies to renditions from United States territory to other countries.
To buttress this argument that the CAT does not have extra-territorial
50
effect, Professor Yoo refers to Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. in
which the Supreme Court held that the Refugee Convention only
51
applied to conduct within United States territory. Fourth, Professor
Yoo posits that even if there is customary international law against
such transfers, executive decisions to render terrorism suspects trump
52
that law.
To demonstrate that transfers of people during a conflict have
been the exclusive domain of the executive branch, Professor Yoo

2004, at A1. Some members of Congress still believe that the Office of Legal Counsel
did offer some guidance on rendition in a March 13, 2002 memorandum. See Letter
from Sen. Patrick Leahy to Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President (Jan. 4,
2005), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200501/010405.html.
45
Yoo, supra note 17, at 1229–30.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1230.
48
Id. at 1228.
49
Id. at 1229.
50
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
51
Id. at 156.
52
Yoo, supra note 17, at 1230 n.201.
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spends several pages on how prisoners of war were handled in the
Revolutionary War, the Quasi-War with France, the War of 1812, the
Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I,
the Interwar Period, World War II, Vietnam, Panama, and the Gulf
53
War. For his own purposes, Professor Yoo picks and chooses when
suspected terrorists should be treated as POWs. For the Geneva Conventions, Professor Yoo believes that suspected terrorists are not enti54
tled to be treated as POWs. But for irregular rendition, he believes
55
they can be treated like prisoners from other armed conflicts. Nowhere does he make explicit the premise that a war on terrorism is
similar enough to prior wars for the past precedents to apply. That
premise is implicit in his analysis. The most relevant comparison Professor Yoo makes is not his list of wars, but a list for the handling of
56
prisoners who were not entitled to “formal” POW treatment. However, rather than cover this point in the text, he relegates it to a foot57
note.
It is apparent that Professor Yoo’s arguments continue to influence the Bush Administration. In 2006, John Bellinger, the State
Department’s legal advisor, in response to questions from the committee that supervises the CAT, stated: “[n]either the text of the Convention, its negotiating history, nor the U.S. record of ratification
supports a view that Article 3 of the CAT applies to persons outside
58
This argument, in different
the territory of the United States.”
clothes, is Professor Yoo’s argument about the Convention’s lack of
extra-territorial effect. Although Mr. Bellinger refers to the Sale decision in his other comments, he does not explicitly credit Professor
Yoo. Yoo’s influence is apparent nonetheless.
Despite the protests against Professor Yoo and despite his unpopularity with human rights organizations, it is clear that many
59
more officials than Mr. Bellinger share his views. Professor Yoo, in
53

Id. at 1206–22.
See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 207,
215–16 (2003).
55
See Yoo, supra note 17, at 1221–22.
56
Id. at 1222.
57
See id. at 1222 n.167 (stating that “[h]istorical practice firmly supports the
power of the President to transfer and otherwise dispose of the liberty of all individuals captured incident to military operations, and not merely those individuals who
may technically be classified as prisoners of war under relevant treaties”).
58
U.S. Dep’t of State, List of Issues to be Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America: Response of the United States of America,
at 32 (April 28, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf.
59
Responses of Alberto Gonzalez, Nominee to be Attorney General, to the Written Supplemental Questions of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Response to
54
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line with the Bush Administration, suggests that our counter60
terrorism policies cannot operate within a criminal law paradigm.
That paradigm has shifted, according to the Bush Administration,
61
from “prosecution” to “prevention.” While I agree that full process
cannot be given to all suspected terrorists, I do not believe that we exist in a binary world where the laws of war are the only alternative.
Perhaps the criminal justice model can be blended with the military
model; a blended form of tribunal to prosecute terrorism suspects is
one possibility.
Concerning irregular rendition, let us imagine that White House
officials and CIA policymakers insist on more flexibility for operations. Behind the scenes, they may not be willing to gamble on aggressive interpretations of American and international law. They may
not completely follow Professor Yoo. Out of caution about getting
too close to the line of illegality or for policy reasons, the executive
branch may ask its lawyers to assume that at least one provision of law,
the CAT, applies to rendition. Similarly, let us imagine a situation in
which the executive detains a non-U.S. citizen on U.S. territory far
away from the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq. Outside the immigration laws and the extradition process, the executive may propose, quickly and secretly, to render the putative terrorist elsewhere.
In such cases, Professor Yoo’s provocative views about the full scope
of executive power may not solve all problems, and an analysis of the
62
CAT will be necessary.
Question 11 (January 25, 2005), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/
Gonzales.Kennedy.supp.pdf.
60
See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 17, at 1193, 1198 (“If September 11 was not an act of
war, then the United States might be limited to the tools of the criminal justice system in its efforts to fight the Qaeda terrorist organization . . . terrorist organizations
such as al Qaeda have now acquired the military power that once only rested in the
hands of nation-states. That change must bring terrorist networks within the laws of
war.”).
61
Tim Golden, Domestic Surveillance: The Advocate; A Junior Aide had a Big Role in
Terror Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A1 (describing Professor Yoo as a “critical
player” in the Bush Administration’s legal response to the terrorist threat); Tim
Golden, Threats and Responses: Tough Justice; After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at 11 (summarizing comments and statements by
various members of White House counsel, which reflect a change to more aggressive
and “forward-leaning” counter-terrorism policies, in the face of devastating terrorist
attacks).
62
Since this Article chooses to explore the role of assurances and monitoring in
depth, I do not discuss other international conventions that may apply, that is, the
Geneva Conventions or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. I
assume that if irregular rendition is made legal under the CAT it is legal under these
other conventions and under customary international law. Testing that assumption
would take me far outside the scope of this Article. Further, accepting one of Profes-
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B. The Convention Against Torture
i.

Historical Framework

The practice of torture goes back to the beginning of human
63
history. The efforts to ban torture do not go back as far. Torture
has been categorized not only as a blatant crime against human
64
rights, but the “most effective weapon against democracy.”
Even
without a specific treaty on torture, reasonable arguments have been
made that torture violates the universal law of nations, making the
65
ban on torture jus cogens under international law. Therefore, international treaties play a double role: supporting jus cogens and creating
prohibitions that have not yet reached a level of international consensus.
The United Nations adopted and opened the CAT for signature
66
on December 10, 1984. The CAT is part of the international community’s broader efforts to end barbarism in the world. The CAT
builds on an international law foundation that was laid by the Hague
67
Convention on the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions on the
sor Chesney’s conclusions about transfers from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, I do not
conduct a separate analysis of the detainees’ due process rights. See Robert Chesney,
Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV.
657, 744 (2006) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that the requirements of substantive due process would be any more or less forgiving than those of CAT.”).
63
See, e.g., Oswaldo Estrada, Human Dignity and the Convention Against Torture: Has
the Burden of Proof Become Heavier than Originally Intended?, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L. 87, 90
(2005); Daniel Rothberg, “What we have seen has been terrible”; Public Presentational Torture and the Communicative Logic of State Terror, 67 ALB. L. REV. 465, 485 (2003).
64
144 CONG. REC. S3013-01 (April 1, 1998) (remarks given by Senator Paul
Wellstone to the United States Senate on the United Nations International Day in
Support of Victims of Torture).
65
See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (stating that the international prohibition of official torture has attained the force of a jus cogens norm). See generally Erika
de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens and its implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 97, 98 (2004) (stating that
the prohibition against torture is a peremptory norm, or jus cogens principle); Karen
Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12
HASTINGS INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 411, 437–39 (1989) (“Torture is widely recognized
as contravening jus cogens.”).
66
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/
english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations]. As of 2005, seventy-four countries
have signed the convention. Id.
67
Hague Convention (IV), Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
and Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. I, IV,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539.
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treatment of combatants and non-combatants during war. As a relatively new effort at international rulemaking by the United Nations,
the CAT expresses the will of the international community and the
signatories to the convention to end both torture and the cruel, in69
human, or degrading treatment of people around the world.
70
President Ronald Reagan signed the CAT on April 18, 1988.
71
The United States Senate ratified it on October 27, 1990. The Senate, however, did so with a number of “understandings” and “declarations.” Thus, the United States Senate attempted to make clear that
the provisions of Articles One through Sixteen were not self72
For my purposes,
executing for purposes of U.S. domestic law.
rather than digress into a discussion of whether the United States
Senate had the right to ratify subject to these particular understandings and declarations, I assume they were valid. Therefore, they can
serve as benchmarks in determining United States obligations under
73
the CAT.
Although it is common to abbreviate the Convention as “CAT,”
one should not forget that the rest of the Convention’s title addresses

68

See e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
69
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at preamble. Torture practices
were first prohibited in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in
1951 by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. This
concept was reaffirmed in 1966 by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty6.asp.
70
134 CONG. REC. S6464-02 (May 23, 1988).
71
136 CONG. REC. S17486, S17491-2 (Oct. 27, 1990) [hereinafter United States
Convention Against Torture Ratification History]. Because the United States did not deposit the instrument of ratification with the United Nations until October 21, 1994,
the United States’ obligations under the Convention did not take effect until thirty
days later. Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2001).
72
United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note 71.
The Senate’s primary reservation was that any obligation to prevent torture goes only
as far as the constitutional requirements existing under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
73
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Section 2, Article 18 of 1969
allows a State ratifying a treaty to make “reservations” unilaterally modifying the legal
effect of the treaty, so long as the reservation is neither prohibited by, nor inconsistent with, the purpose of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
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“other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” In
short, the CAT addresses two levels of conduct: torture and CID.
These two levels overlap with some provisions of American law. For
instance, our Constitution forbids both torture and CID on criminal
defendants, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice forbids torture
74
and CID on detainees of the United States military.
The CAT, in basic terms, outlaws torture and requires signatories to enact and to enforce criminal laws in their nations against tor75
ture. According to one non-governmental organization that tracks
the world’s progress in outlawing torture, the CAT is the “most protective of any of the treaties to which the United States is a party,”
76
protecting even against harmful expulsion and extradition. Therefore, hopes for better treatment of candidates for rendition largely
rest on the specific provisions of the CAT.
ii.

Specific Articles

Article One of the Convention defines torture as “any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” to punish, obtain information, coerce,
77
or intimidate. This definition specifically excludes any pain and suf78
fering resulting from lawful sanctions and punishments. To be torture, the conduct must be an intentional infliction of pain or suffering committed by officials; it is something “perpetrated or sanctioned

74

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI; see also 10 U.S.C. § 855 (2000) (prohibiting
punishments by court-martial involving “flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment”). The 2005 McCain
Amendment tried to close the loophole that reportedly allowed the CIA to engage in
CID on non-U.S. citizens outside the United States. The McCain Amendment “prohibits the ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ of anyone in the
custody of the U.S. Government. This provision, modeled after wording in the U.N.
Convention Against Torture . . . is meant to overturn an administration position that
the convention does not apply to foreigners outside the United States.” Josh White
& R. Jeffrey Smith, White House Aims to Block Legislation on Detainees, WASH. POST, July
23, 2005, at A1. The newest source of American law on interrogations of suspected
terrorists is the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Military Commissions Act of 2006,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:2:./temp/~c109d7wXgE::.
Under McCain and the MCA, the definition of CID is still tied to Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment standards.
75
See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 4–7.
76
Association of the Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human Rights and
Global Justice, Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions," at 32 (2005), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/
TortureByProxy.pdf [hereinafter Torture By Proxy].
77
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 1.
78
Id.
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79

by a nation’s authorities.” While the definition of torture should
not be artificially limited, it should not be so expansive that it merges
into criminal justice standards on interrogation or into the CAT’s
separate definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. A
balance is necessary.
Article Two of the CAT makes clear that the ban on torture applies at all times and under all circumstances: “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
80
invoked as a justification of torture.” In short, the ban on torture is
absolute and not subject to any exceptions.
Article Three of the CAT is most relevant to irregular rendition.
This article requires that no country “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to tor81
ture.” It is significant that CID is not mentioned in this article and
that a parallel provision related to CID does not exist under the Con82
vention. As such, the definition on which the legality of irregular
rendition turns is only the likelihood of torture.
Since the Senate viewed many of the CAT’s provisions as not being self-executing, the United States took actions after ratification to
fulfill its commitments under the treaty. In 1994, Congress barred
torture outside the United States by United States citizens and United
83
States agencies. In doing so, the new federal statute borrowed the
84
definition of torture from the CAT. In addition, the statute defines
severe mental pain or suffering as “prolonged mental harm” caused
by any of the following: intentional severe physical pain or suffering;
use of or threat of mind-altering substances or anything else that can
greatly alter sense or personality; threat of imminent death; or the

79

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2004).
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 2.
81
Id. at art. 3.
82
Days before the McCain Amendment passed, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice declared that the United States, as a matter of policy, does not engage in CID.
See Joel Brinkley, Rice Appears to Reassure Some Europeans on Treatment of Terror Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A6. What is still not clear is whether the Bush Administration has made a corresponding change in policy to preclude renditions when
there are substantial grounds for believing that the suspect is in danger of CID.
83
18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (LexisNexis 2006). The statute not only operates against
U.S. citizens for acts of torture committed outside the United States, but also extends
its jurisdiction over alleged offenders present in the U.S. regardless of the offenders’
or victims’ citizenship. Id.
84
18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
80
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threat of putting someone else in any of these situations. The statute, however, does not define “severe physical pain” and does not
give much guidance on determining what pain is severe enough for
the statute to apply. For actions within the United States, a statute
was not deemed necessary because torture was already disallowed under the United States Constitution and under various state and fed86
eral statutes.
The CAT’s definition of torture is open to different interpretations. Severe pain or suffering is often interpreted only to prohibit
87
acts so extreme that they are condemned world-wide.
The State
Department, in one interpretation, states that protection from torture under the CAT is “usually reserved for extreme, deliberate, and
88
unusually cruel practices.” Another interpretation from the Justice
Department stated that torture requires specific intent to inflict suffering “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function,
89
or even death.” The Justice Department, however, abandoned this
controversial interpretation in time for Alberto Gonzalez and Michael Chertoff to be confirmed respectively as Attorney General and
90
head of the Department of Homeland Security. Even so, for at least
a year after this interpretation had been abandoned, the Bush Administration continued to operate under stingy definitions such that
water-boarding, namely giving the suspect the sensation of suffoca91
tion through dripping water and wet towels, may have been interpreted as being short of torture. The McCain Amendment, which
passed at the end of 2005 as the Detainee Treatment Act, attempted
to put an end to such practices and stinginess. All United States

85

18 U.S.C.S. § 2340(2)(A)–(D) (LexisNexis 2006).
Torture has long been illegal under various state and federal laws that prohibit
assault, battery, and murder. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 1111 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining
and prohibiting murder); see also S. Rep. No. 103-107, at 59 (1993) (“The definition
for ‘severe pain and mental suffering’ incorporates the understanding made by the
Senate concerning this term.”).
87
President’s Message to Congress Transmitting the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Summary and
Analysis of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, May 23, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-200, reprinted in
13857 U.S. Cong. Serial Set at 3.
88
Id. at 4.
89
Torture Memorandum, supra note 44, at 1.
90
See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, on Legal
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf.
91
Mayer, supra note 14, at 106.
86
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agencies were prevented from engaging in torture or in cruel, inhu92
man, and degrading tactics. Now it is much more difficult for the
Bush Administration to argue with a straight face that water-boarding
is short of both torture and CID. Bush’s lawyers are left with a controversial argument that the President can trump Congress through
commander-in-chief powers.
As with any legal standard, some applications of Article Three
93
are clear-cut while other applications are ambiguous. In some irregular renditions, the grounds for believing that the person about to
be expelled, returned, or extradited will be tortured are close to zero.
Such situations, to state the obvious, do not present “substantial
grounds.” In other renditions, the grounds for believing that someone will be tortured are close to 100%. Such situations, just as obviously, present substantial grounds. Cases between the two obvious
poles require further analysis.
The CAT neither defines “substantial grounds” nor qualifies Article Three. The United States Senate, perhaps aware of Article
Three’s ambiguity, added a specific understanding of Article Three
94
upon ratification. The Senate’s understanding was that “substantial
95
grounds for believing” means “more likely than not.”
What appeared to be a clarification, however, really traded one sort of ambiguity for another. As a result, the Senate’s understanding may have
actually watered down the CAT’s requirement, making it easier to be
96
in compliance on renditions. This assumes that “more likely than
not” is a more lenient standard for the executive branch than “substantial grounds.” The higher the bar for the possibility of torture,
the more leeway the executive has with irregular rendition. Rendition is prohibited only when the belief that the suspect will be tortured in the receiving country reaches that bar.
92
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000dd(a) (LexisNexis 2006)
(“No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
93
See infra Part II.C.
94
United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note 71
95
Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (setting the standard as “more likely than
not” for asylum-related removal cases); Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir.
2004);
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003).
96
Contrast the CAT standard with the standard for seeking asylum in the United
States, which only requires a “well-founded fear” of harm proving that such fear is
reasonable rather than probable. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31
(1987) (interpreting “well-founded fear of persecution” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2000)).
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The second part of Article Three makes clear that a rendition’s
legality is tied to specific facts and to a totality of circumstances. It
states that “[f]or the purpose of determining whether there are such
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the
State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass vio97
lations of human rights.” Other than its short list of “gross, flagrant,
or mass violations,” Article Three does not provide much guidance
on what those “relevant considerations” are.
As a part of the process of conforming American law to the CAT,
the United States changed some of its provisions on extradition and
98
immigration. In 1998, Congress required the relevant federal agencies to put in place regulations “not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which
there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in
danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the per99
This aspect of
son is physically present in the United States.”
American law corresponds closely with the language of Article Three
from the CAT. Regulations were passed that applied to the role of
the Department of Homeland Security and the Justice Department in
100
transfers.
Regulations were also passed that applied to the role of
101
the State Department in transfers. Added up, the regulations make
clear that Article Three principles apply to removals and extraditions
and, thus, those regulations serve as one benchmark under American
law.
Yet, as noted above, my focus is on irregular renditions of people
who are at all times outside United States territory. I do not fully analyze transfers of people from within the United States, transfers of
people attempting to enter or to stay in the United States through
the immigration process, or transfers from the special jurisdiction of
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My focus is on secret activities that the CIA
102
has allegedly carried out in the shadows—in foreign countries.
Those transfers may involve a different benchmark.
97

See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3.
See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (1998).
99
Id.
100
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–18, 1208.16–18 (2006).
101
See 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2006).
102
A cottage industry has been created for identifying airplanes involved in CIA
renditions. The identifications are sometimes as specific as the types of vessel and
the tail numbers. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter
Flights, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at A1.
98
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Whether or not the CIA has adopted regulations to implement
103
Article Three principles is classified.
Therefore, some official observers, in line with Professor Yoo, may continue to challenge
whether Article Three even applies to irregular renditions. Their
challenge might involve arguments that the CAT is not self-executing
and that CAT’s territorial reach is limited. Rather than debate selfexecution and territoriality, I have assumed that at least Article Three
applies to CIA activities. In that way, I leave more space to examine
pre-transfer assurances and post-transfer monitoring.
iii. Cases and Precedents
Some people have lived to tell what they endured through alleged CIA renditions. Notable examples are Khaled El-Masri, a German rendered from Macedonia to Afghanistan, and Mamdouh
104
Both men
Habib, an Australian rendered from Pakistan to Egypt.
105
Both men
have received substantial attention from the media.
claim that, while innocent of any connection to terrorism, they were
106
mistreated in their receiving countries. As a result, Masri has filed a
107
In addition, a Canadian named
lawsuit against the United States.
Maher Arar alleges that he was detained during a lay-over at Kennedy
Airport in New York City and, after transit through Jordan, rendered
108
Arar’s case, unlike Masri’s and
to Syria where he was tortured.
103

I know this from the CIA’s pre-publication review of this manuscript.
See Whitlock, supra note 1; Jehl & Johnston, supra note 19.
105
Ian Cobain, CIA Rendition Flights: Case Studies: Seized, Held, Tortured: 6 Tell the
Same Tale, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 6, 2005, at Home Pages 4; Tony Patterson, Germans
Investigate CIA Kidnap of Innocent Citizen, THE INDEPENDENT, February 22, 2006, at 18;
Farah Stockman, 7 Detainees Report Transfer to Nations that Use Torture, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr.26, 2006, at A3; Nicholas Watt, US Accused of Using Gangster Tactics over
Terror Suspects: Washington 'outsourced torture', Says Senator: Critics Attack Lack of Evidence
in Report, THE GUARDIAN, January 25, 2006, at 14; Craig Whitlock, Probe of Detainee
Transfer Finds Many CIA Flights, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2006, at A20.
106
In Masri’s case, the United States has apologized to the German Government
for rounding up Masri by confusing him with a “known” terrorist with a similar
name. See Glenn Kessler, U.S. Said to Admit German’s Abduction Was an Error, WASH.
POST, Dec. 7, 2005, at A18.
107
Khaled El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006).
108
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp.2d 250, 252–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see Complaint at
4, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.N.D.Y. 2006) (No. CV 04 0249), available at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/ArarComplaint.pdf; Memorandum and Order for Dismissal at 2–9, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(S.N.D.Y. 2006) (No. CV 04 0249), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/
v2/legal/september_11th/docs/Arar_Order_21606.pdf; see also Nina Bernstein, U.S.
Defends Detentions at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at B1; Scott Shane, The Costs of
Outsourcing Interrogation: A Canadian Muslim’s Long Ordeal in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2005, at 10.
104
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109

Habib’s, began in the immigration context.
But so far none of
these men has obtained a verdict against the United States. For such
lawsuits to make it to a verdict, the plaintiffs have to surmount the
steep obstacles of standing, of the political question doctrine, and of
110
the government’s assertion of the state secrets evidentiary privilege.
Although this Article does not focus on renditions in the immigration context, they are useful in interpreting Article Three of the
Convention because they provide what little law there is on how Article Three is applied in practice. With no Supreme Court case on
point, lower courts in the federal system have interpreted the “more
likely than not” standard under Article Three as requiring at least a
fifty-one percent chance that the person will be tortured after rendi111
tion.
In effect, they have applied the “preponderance of the evidence” standard from civil cases. Martin Lederman, formerly at the
Justice Department and an outspoken critic of the Bush Administration, has stated an obvious problem with this standard: “The Convention only applies when you know a suspect is more likely than not to
112
be tortured, but what if you kind of know? That’s not enough.” Mr.
Lederman, however, does not go so far as to argue that the vagueness
of the standard makes it unconstitutional. After all, the preponderance standard is the same one that applies to civil verdicts which often involve billions of dollars.
Other experts have concluded that “the prohibition against refoulement to torture requires both an objective assessment of the
conditions in the state to which an individual may be transferred, and
113
a subjective assessment of the danger particular to the individual.”
114
This danger must be more than a “mere suspicion.” One definition
does not conclude the analysis, however. As often occurs in the interpretation of statutes, definitions move from one phrase to another
without a clear ending. The catch phrases are a moving target. Substantial grounds become “more likely than not.” “More likely than

109

See Bernstein, supra note 108.
In fact, Arar’s lawsuit was dismissed because Arar lacked standing, the Torture
Victim Prevention Act did not create a private right of action, and there was no subject-matter jurisdiction for a Bivens action. The court’s decision did not even fully
reach the political question or state secrets issues. See Memorandum and Order for
Dismissal, supra note 108. at 77 n.14, 85–86.
111
See, e.g., Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting
“more likely than not” in relation to torture, religious, and political persecutions of
an alien to mean fifty-one percent).
112
Mayer, supra note 14, at 108.
113
Torture By Proxy, supra note 76, at 32.
114
Id.
110
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not” then becomes “credible threats” or “fifty-one percent likely” or
more than “mere suspicion.” Beyond repeating catch phrases, other
methods are necessary for determining the legality of irregular rendition.
The United States, as noted, has enacted regulations, consistent
115
with the CAT, for removing aliens.
Here, in the immigration context, assurances are laid out as one explicit factor in determining the
legality of a rendition. To remove aliens, the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, determines whether the as116
What is sufficient and what is
surances are “sufficiently reliable.”
reliable is left to executive discretion.
Other factors emerge from the immigration cases. The possible
torture in the receiving country must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
117
other person acting in an official capacity.” If the rendered suspect
is tortured by private parties, the United States would not be responsible under the CAT. For the CAT to apply, the receiving govern118
To show that
ment must sanction or conduct the actual torture.
the receiving government has acquiesced in the torture is not
straightforward. As in other contexts, the line between private and
public conduct is often blurred. In this context, courts have held that
acquiescence “is not limited to ‘actual knowledge, or willful acceptance’; the ‘willful blindness’ of government officials suffices” for tor119
If torture by lower-level officials is routine, that may serve as
ture.
evidence that higher-level officials, or the government itself, illegally
120
turned its eye from torture.
It is particularly difficult to find public action, under the CAT
standard, when the receiving country lacks a central government that
121
functions in the entire national territory. So, in what might appear
a paradox, the CAT makes it easier to render to lawless areas than to
territories under firm governmental control. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that if there is no central government, the receiv115

8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(2) (1999).
Id.
117
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 1.
118
Id.
119
Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Zheng v.
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that both “actual
knowledge” and “willful blindness” constitute acquiescence under the CAT).
120
See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004).
121
The Convention does protect against torture occurring under a private party’s
control, but only to the extent that an existing government gives consent or acquiescence to the conduct. Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 787.
116
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ing country could not be involved in torture or could not acquiesce
in torture; by application, the CAT did not prohibit the transfer of a
122
person to Somalia. The Somalia case, however, only applied to the
removal from the United States of an alien who would not be inter123
rogated in the receiving country.
The context for terrorism suspects is different. Unlike the removal of most aliens, irregular rendition involves close cooperation
between the sending and the receiving countries. American renditions of terrorism suspects have two basic purposes: first, taking the
suspect from the “battlefield,” and second, obtaining information
from him about terrorist plots and terrorist cells. In counterterrorism practice, it seems pointless for the CIA to render suspects to
lawless areas. That would run counter to the purposes of irregular
rendition, especially the second purpose. The countries that have
been reported as recipients of rendered suspects, Egypt and Syria to
name but two, are not like Somalia. They have central governments
and intelligence services that control—sometimes brutally—their entire country. They may be taking rendered suspects as a way of cooperating with the United States on counter-terrorism; secular regimes
in the Middle East, including those of Egypt and Syria, may share the
American assessment about the magnitude of the risk from al-Qaeda
and other groups that are motivated by a radical view of Islam. Those
regimes may be cooperating for their own survival.
Yet, reports that Syria has received terrorism suspects from the
United States may suggest something more subtle about cooperation
out of self-interest. Even when diplomatic relations between two
countries are strained, as they are between the United States and
Syria, sometimes intelligence services are able to work out mutually
beneficial deals. That is, sometimes the relationship between spymasters is quite different from the relationship between diplomats. Not
always do the scenes on stage correspond with what goes on off the
stage.
iv. Country Reports
Although the second part of Article Three states that a “consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”
124
should be taken “into account,” it does not explain what sources set

122
123
124

D-Muhumed v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3.
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this pattern. Further, it does not describe the exact pattern that
shows substantial grounds that a rendered suspect will be tortured.
In the modern age, citizens have many sources of information to
check on governmental activities. Even those activities which governments shroud as “classified information” sometimes pop out into
the public discourse. Thanks to the work of our own government,
other governments, international bodies, the media, and nongovernmental organizations, citizens have many sources for assessing
the human rights records of countries around the globe. The reports
about these countries, however, are not usually focused on the CAT.
They are more general than specific.
The United States Department of State issues annual country reports that assess human rights conditions, past and present, and inci125
dents of human rights violations in various countries.
These reports are influential. For the CAT analysis, American courts consider
them relevant, though not solely conclusive, to the likelihood that a
126
A negative counperson will be tortured in the receiving country.
try report, however, does not always carry over from one government
to another government in the same country. In theory, a new government, to borrow from a criminal procedure concept, should be
able to purge the taint of prior practices. As one court noted, a
change of a country’s constitution and the adoption of a better policy
“regarding political activism, police brutality, and civil liberties,”
might alleviate concerns about the receiving country’s human rights
127
Thus, country reports are one factor
violations, including torture.
in the totality of the circumstances for assessing the legality of renditions under the CAT.
Some courts have interpreted the “more likely than not” standard to require past acts of torture and “gross, flagrant, or mass viola128
tions of human rights,” which is indeed a high standard.
In addition, for the CAT to prevent rendition, the risk of torture must be

125

See id.
See Zarouite v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The State Department’s regular country reports are generally persuasive of country conditions . . . but
are open to contradiction.”); Tissah v. Ashcroft, 107 F. App’x 369 (4th Cir. 2004)
(finding that State Department country reports detailing torture of detainees were
relevant indicator of conditions in country).
127
Kourteva v. I.N.S., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that
policies changed in Bulgaria when the government shifted from communists to socialist-democrats).
128
Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(3)(iii–iv) (1999) (codification of this standard).
126
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129

related to a specific person.
For these reasons, it is possible that a
rendition could be legal in the face of abuses in the receiving country. The more tenuous the evidence of past human rights violations,
the weaker the link between general conditions and the person being
considered for rendition, the more likely the person can be rendered
130
in compliance with the CAT. In short, a “credible” threat of future
131
torture of a specific person must exist for the CAT to apply.
Thus,
the CAT standard looks forward.
v.

Commentators

This Article is not the first to analyze provisions of the CAT that
apply to renditions. Various non-governmental organizations, serving
as sound secondary sources on the CAT, have already assessed the le132
gality of America’s secret rendition program.
These assessments,
however, whether by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (the “City Bar”) or by Human Rights Watch, tend to substitute
policy preferences for legal analysis.
The City Bar defines “extraordinary rendition” as a transfer from
United States custody “to a foreign state in circumstances that make it
more likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture or
133
Although Article Three
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”
of the CAT only refers to the likelihood of torture, the City Bar uses
“torture” and “cruel, inhuman, or degrading” as interchangeable
concepts. By those means, the City Bar’s definition already stacks the
deck against rendition. Because of its distaste for the policy of rendition, the City Bar tends to state baldly that neither assurances nor
monitoring after rendition can tip the balance toward legality under
the CAT.

129

Human Rights Watch, “Empty Promises:” Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard
Against Torture, at 4, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/
diplomatic0404.pdf [hereinafter Empty Promises].
130
See, e.g., Pena v. U. S. Atty. Gen., 134 F. App’x 384, 386 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying protection to alien based on anonymous death threats); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 93 F.
App’x 370 (3d Cir. 2004) (denying protection to alien who did not introduce any evidence of past torture or potential future torture).
131
Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1219–20.
132
See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Enduring Abuse: Torture and Cruel Abuse
by the United States at Home and Abroad, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/
torture/torture_report.pdf (“Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
are prohibited at all times under human rights law, even in war or when fighting terrorism. . . . The prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment at all times is
applicable to state agents under Article 16(2) of the Convention Against
Torture. . . .”).
133
Torture by Proxy, supra note 76, at 4.
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The City Bar’s statements are divided into three parts. First, assuming that American diplomats will be involved in obtaining assurances from the receiving countries, the City Bar concludes that diplomats will not press hard enough to obtain proper assurances
because of their “need to maintain diplomatic, trade, and commer134
cial relations of significance to the United States.”
This assumes,
without evidence, that diplomatic relations are zero-sum and that
renditions are a lower priority for our State Department. Second, the
City Bar claims that the mechanisms to monitor rendition are inade135
quate.
Rather than focus on CIA practices, however, the City Bar
draws on negative experiences with monitoring at the Department of
136
To the City Bar, secrecy and abuse always go hand in
Defense.
hand. Third, the City Bar is troubled by “unfettered discretion” in
137
the executive branch.
Once again, the City Bar goes too far. The
executive branch has always had broad discretion across the range of
138
national security issues.
This is nothing new. Although the CAT
does not require judicial oversight, the City Bar is particularly troubled that our courts are not involved in assessing assurances before
139
They call this a “procedural shortcomsuspects are transferred.
140
The City Bar even claims, on thin authority, that the lack of
ing.”
141
judicial oversight “likely violates international law.”
The law on irregular rendition is grounded in facts and rules.
The law does not float with the wishful thinking of human rights or134

Id. at 88–89.
Id. at 89.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 89.
138
The text of the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution provides some
of the President’s authority over national security matters. For example, on the Executive’s power over national security information, see the Supreme Court’s recognition in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988), that “[t]he President,
after all, is the ‘Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.’
His authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security . . . flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President
and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.” (citations omitted)
The Court also recognizes Executive authority over intelligence operations. Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875) (“[The President] was undoubtedly authorized
during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to employ
secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information respecting the strength,
resources, and movements of the enemy.”). For the President’s power to respond to
invasion and insurrection as commander-in-chief, see The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635,
668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not
only authorized but bound to resist force by force.”).
139
Torture by Proxy, supra note 76, at 89.
140
Id.
141
Id.
135
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ganizations. The fact is the CAT does not require that a person about
to be rendered must have a hearing where he can provide independent evidence of the chances that he will be tortured in the receiving
country. He is not entitled to attack the adequacy of the assurances
and the monitoring that the sending country proposes to put in
place. Even so, as a matter of policy, the United States may deem it
worthwhile to provide such a hearing. That could increase the fairness and the reliability of the process related to rendition. That is an
option for policymakers, not a requirement, under the CAT. Policy
and law are not the same things.
If the United States were tempted to go down the hearing route,
American intelligence officials would demand various protections.
They would insist, at a minimum, that these hearings be before executive officials or before a court with secret proceedings like the one
that handles applications for national security wiretaps under the
142
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
For the intelligence community, transparency on irregular rendition soon loses out to secrecy.
Whatever the variations on the hearing, intelligence officials would
strongly oppose any process that is completely open to the public.
The sources and methods of rendition, the diplomatic interactions
with foreign governments, and the interactions with liaison services
would easily take the rendition into the classified realm. There, the
intelligence officials would not stand for open government.
Other groups have joined the chorus with the City Bar. Voices
143
The respect is mufrom Human Rights Watch strike similar notes.
tual, and the City Bar relies to a large degree on its colleague’s
144
work.
Human Rights Watch concludes that assurances and moni145
In the introduction to one report,
toring are “empty promises.”
Human Rights Watch states:
[P]ost-return monitoring per definition implies a fundamental
distrust of the formal diplomatic assurances and lack of confidence in domestic mechanisms to hold perpetrators of torture accountable in the countries offering such assurances. Sending governments would no doubt argue that post-return monitoring is
merely a failsafe, and that they would not return anyone whom
they genuinely believed to be at risk. But when governments and
international organizations dispatch monitors to observe elections
142

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 1803 (LexisNexis 2006).
See Empty Promises, supra note 129.
144
See Torture by Proxy, supra note 76, at 86–88.
145
Indeed, the title of the Human Rights Watch report, relied on heavily by the
City Bar of New York, includes the “empty promise” phrase. See Empty Promises, supra note 129.
143
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or assess human rights they do so because they fear election fraud
and human rights violations. It follows that the use of post-return
monitoring in cases of returns involving diplomatic assurances
amounts to an acknowledgement that returnees are at risk of tor146
ture or ill-treatment.

The world is not as tidy as Human Rights Watch would like to believe.
Just because a person fears something does not mean that something
exists. In a different context, for example, the fact that a doctor orders comprehensive blood tests for a patient does not prove that the
patient has leukemia. The tests are a precaution. The tests are a
means of lowering the level of uncertainty. Sometimes fears are unfounded or exaggerated. Sometimes the doctors are overly cautious.
Sometimes the tests are unnecessary. Sometimes, to return to Human Rights Watch’s context, election monitors are dispatched to increase confidence in something positive, in an election without fraud.
Human Rights Watch allows public policy concerns to inflate its
evaluation of legal standards. It is correct that “mere accession to
U.N. human rights instruments” does not guarantee a country’s
147
compliance with the “obligations enshrined therein.” But much of
Human Rights Watch’s report, indifferent to Article Three’s clear
statement that the CAT only applies to the risk of torture, proceeds as
if Article Three applied to both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Whether by carelessness or by design, Human
Rights Watch blurs the Article Three standard into a higher standard:
a certainty that the suspect will not be tortured. Referring to work
from the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Human Rights Watch
states that “[b]efore a person may be returned, assurances must be
‘unequivocal,’ that is, leaving absolutely no doubt that no torture or
148
ill-treatment will occur.”
That, however, is not how the United
States interprets the law.
Human Rights Watch seeks a rule that allows irregular rendition
only if the United States is certain the receiving country will not torture the suspect. Throughout, Human Rights Watch does not leave
room for doubt. But Article Three prohibits rendition only if there
149
are “substantial grounds for believing” torture may occur.
It does
not insist on absolute knowledge. It leaves room for doubt. As noble
as its work is, Human Rights Watch’s insistence on knowledge with
“absolutely no doubt” takes the legal standard past beyond a reason146
147
148
149

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 7.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3.

RADSANFINAL.DOC

30

10/20/2006 2:06:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1

able doubt, past the legal standard which applies to guilt in American
criminal trials. Its insistence on absolute knowledge comes across as
naïve, making it easier for hardened officials in any political administration to dismiss those expectations and recommendations.
It does make sense to hold the executive branch to high standards. But when standards are set too high, such expectations may
have the paradoxical outcome of making it more difficult to bring
about incremental improvements in the oversight on rendition. To
the extent that observers from Human Rights Watch base their arguments on the law, they should factor in the law as it is in the United
States rather than the law as they would like it to be here. Perhaps
Human Rights Watch should come down from the mountain to help
those who are attempting to make some progress, step by step, in the
plains and valleys of American counter-terrorism.
Substantial
grounds for believing torture will occur, the CAT standard, is not the
same as any possibility that torture will occur.
More sensibly, Human Rights Watch does acknowledge the twopart framework at the core of this Article: assurances of proper
treatment from the receiving country and monitoring of the terror150
ism suspect after transfer.
But more by rhetoric than by analysis, it
sweeps away the possible adequacy of assurances and monitoring.
According to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he widespread or systematic
use of torture in many of the countries to which people have been returned, indicates that diplomatic assurances and post-return monitor151
ing are inadequate safeguards against torture and ill treatment.” By
this argument, Human Rights Watch is too pessimistic. The past does
not always doom the future.
Although general conditions in a country are important to the
CAT analysis, Article Three addresses a particular rendition of a per152
son, not rendition in the abstract. General conditions, while probative, do not determine the outcome on a particular rendition between intelligence services. The CIA can render a suspect to a place
with a horrible human rights record and deplorable prisoner practices without that suspect being tortured. That much is a theoretical
possibility. When the CIA is the sender, United States law focuses on
whether the odds are more likely than not that the receiver will tor150

See Empty Promises, supra note 129, at 4.
Id.
152
See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 3. It is important to recall that the refouler, return, expulsion, or extradition to which the CAT refers involves “a person” and the likelihood that “he” will be tortured rather than any
broadly applied condemnation of a nation’s human rights record. Id.
151
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153

ture the suspect. This one standard from Article Three anchors the
law on irregular rendition.
Before any further examination of Article Three, as a reminder,
it is useful to turn the analysis around to United States practices.
Separate from the abuses that have occurred in our state and federal
prisons, separate from the mistreatment that has occurred in our
military detention facilities such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, it
still seems likely that other countries can render persons to the
United States consistent with their CAT obligations. Surely, the City
Bar and Human Rights Watch are not so adamant to take the United
States permanently off the receiving list for regular and irregular
renditions. To America’s credit, rather than tolerate abuses and mis154
treatment, we investigate them.
We attempt to prosecute the
155
wrongdoers. That is the way we stay within the rule of law. That is
our redemption.
C. Clear-Cut Cases
Without digging any deeper into statutes, legislative history,
commentary, or court cases, one can tether the analysis of irregular
rendition to two clear-cut examples: the first in which there are not
substantial grounds for believing torture will occur, and the second in
which there are substantial grounds, no matter the assurances and
the monitoring. Rather than parse language from legal texts, one
can provide an example of a rendition that is clearly legal and another example of a rendition that is clearly illegal. These examples,
in turn, can be used as analogies to interpret actual practices of rendition.
i.

Safe Haven

Imagine, for example, that during a raid in Afghanistan, American forces capture a blond, blue-eyed man of about thirty who had
been fighting on the side of the Taliban. The captive speaks English
well, but with a German accent. He does not have a passport or any
other form of identification on him. He has a long beard and the
pungent odor of someone who has not bathed in weeks. In response
to questioning from United States military intelligence officials, who
153
See United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History Reservation
2, supra note 71, at S17492.
154
See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Reservist to Offer Guilty Plea in Jail Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2005, at A6 (concerning prosecution of United States soldier involved in prisoner
abuse).
155
See, e.g., id.
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quickly arrive on the scene, the captive claims to be a Swiss citizen
from a small town near Zurich. He says his name is Karl Rohner, and
that he is thirty-three years old.
The American authorities promptly inform the Swiss authorities.
Because the Swiss do not have much of a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, the Americans go through their State Department to direct inquiries to the Swiss Foreign Ministry in Berne. The State Department asks the Swiss whether they have any record of a Rohner
that matches the captive’s age and appearance. Rohner checks out.
Meanwhile, during further questioning, Rohner tells his American
captors that he came to Afghanistan on a humanitarian mission for a
Swiss non-governmental organization. He claims the Taliban kidnapped him and forced him to fight on their side. Other captives
from the American raid, in separate questioning, confirm much of
Rohner’s story. Soon, lucky for Rohner, the American authorities are
ready to release him. For his safety, they will not release him in Afghanistan, however. The Swiss authorities say he must come home to
apply for a new passport. Frugal to the extreme even in matters of
state, they ask their American friends to handle Rohner’s transport
back to Switzerland. But the lawyers who represent the Department
of Defense hesitate. They need to ensure that a quick transfer on a
military aircraft does not violate the law. In particular, they are concerned about irregular renditions because of the CAT.
Surely, even if Switzerland has an extradition treaty with Af156
ghanistan, human rights organizations and other defenders of human rights do not expect the Americans to forego an irregular rendi157
tion on these facts. The courts in Afghanistan barely function.
To
the extent that they do function, their process is slow and confused.
Their participants are at risk of attacks from the Taliban and their
supporters. Far away, Switzerland is a safe haven for Rohner. Switzerland is his home. Switzerland is a member of the CAT with a nearly
158
impeccable human rights record.
This scenario is thus a clear example where irregular rendition makes good policy and good law.
Rohner can be transferred consistent with Article Three of the CAT.
156

Afghanistan and Switzerland do not appear to have a bilateral extradition
treaty or to be members of a common multinational extradition agreement. See
United
Nations
Treaty
Collection,
http://untreaty.un.org/English/
treaty.asp (last visited August 23, 2006).
157
See Faiz Ahmed, Judicial Reform in Afghanistan: A Case Study in the New Criminal
Procedure Code, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 102 (2005) (noting Afghanistan’s shortage of state-sponsored legal institutions and its difficulties in establishing
judicial processes).
158
See infra Part V.
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The Lion’s Den

For a clear boundary at the other end of the field, imagine a hypothetical from the past. Saddam Hussein, to the despair of the Iraqi
people, is still in power. A leading Iraqi dissident, a Kurd—call him
Mustapha Chalabi—escapes from Iraq by walking around checkpoints into Jordan. In Amman he purchases a false passport in a different name. Then he flies toward London on a British Airways
flight. After the flight lands at Heathrow, while he is presenting himself at the immigration check, he whispers into the British official’s
ear that his passport is false. He says he is a top Iraqi dissident and
needs to speak to the CIA officer who he is sure must be somewhere
on duty near the airport.
Within a few days, while Chalabi is detained at the airport under
joint British-American control, the American authorities confirm that
he is indeed who he claims to be: a prominent dissident. Chalabi
proposes to his interrogators a covert action to kill Saddam Hussein
and to put Chalabi in power in Iraq. While Chalabi is in custody, a
story, based on anonymous sources, leaks to the Financial Times. The
Americans, the article says, are plotting with Chalabi against Saddam
Hussein.
Various American agencies consult on what they should do.
Lines of communication are opened up between Washington, D.C.
and London. After consultation, the intelligence professionals state
that they have no interest in working with Chalabi. Many of them
had concluded, long ago, that he and his family are riddled with intelligence fabricators. In addition, they realize that the American
President, a firm believer in honesty in international relations, does
not have an appetite or a tolerance for covert action. The consensus,
led by the CIA, is that it is not worth debriefing Chalabi anymore. He
should be sent back to Iraq. The British do not want to keep him either.
For the next step, an inter-agency team of American lawyers is
formed. The lawyer from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, an avid reader of law review articles and an expert on international law, suggests that sending Chalabi back to Iraq would violate
the CAT. Iraq has an atrocious human rights record and, under Sad159
dam Hussein, the country was not a member of the CAT. The law159
Iraq’s post-Saddam government has still not ratified the CAT. See Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention Against Torture
Ratifications
and
Reservations,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/
countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2006) (in which Iraq is not listed as
a participant).
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yer from the CIA suggests they obtain written assurances from Saddam that Chalabi will not be harmed. If necessary, they can even ask
Saddam to allow monitoring and inspection after Chalabi is transferred. In response, a lawyer from the State Department argues that
a leader who cannot be trusted to fulfill his obligations to the United
Nations on ceasefire arrangements and on inspections cannot be
trusted on other matters. The State Department lawyer reminds the
group that Saddam has a horrific record of dealing with dissidents.
He executes them without legal process. His atrocities include the
poison gassing of Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War and of Kurds in
putting down an internal uprising. Saddam knows about Chalabi’s
plans. Any assurances from Saddam, even to the American President
himself, would be worth far less than the paper they were written on.
Surely the Americans (and the British) would be reasonable in
concluding that a substantial risk of torture, if not a risk of death, exists if Chalabi is returned home. The press has revealed Chalabi’s
plotting against Saddam. Saddam, who has a blatant disregard for international conventions, is ruthless with dissenters. Accordingly, this
scenario serves as an example where irregular rendition, no matter
the assurances, no matter the possibility of monitoring and oversight
after the transfer, would be bad policy and bad law. This scenario is
the functional equivalent of Saddam promising to kill Chalabi as soon
as the defector returned home.
Between the two boundaries of the safe haven and the lion’s den
are an infinite number of examples where the analysis is much more
difficult. That is the gray area this Article continues to explore.
D. Legal Exposure
Another way of exploring the legality of irregular rendition is to
ask what, if anything, might happen to U.S. officials if they violate Ar160
ticle Three of the CAT.
Could they be exposed to criminal prosecution or civil suit in the United States?
As to criminal exposure, it is safe to assume that several officials
at headquarters and in the field would be involved in any particular
rendition. The capture of Abu Omar from Milan illustrates that
point. The Italian magistrate, through his indictment, suggests that
several American officials were involved in staking out Abu Omar and
160
The odds that the United States could assert jurisdiction over a foreign official
are so low that any further analysis of the exposure of foreign officials does not seem
necessary. Further, I do not analyze the extent to which detainees in CIA custody
may delay or prevent an irregular rendition through a writ of habeas corpus or other
means. The viewpoint of this section is thus after the fact of transfer.
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161

capturing him.
Such group action exposes the officers to criminal
liability under doctrines of attempt, aiding and abetting, and con162
spiracy. Indeed, the media have noted that some discussions within
the Bush Administration’s secret circle have recognized the possibility
163
of group liability for irregular renditions.
But for group liability to
164
To be
be possible, it must be connected to an underlying crime.
illegal, attempt, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy need to be at165
tached to something specific.
An aggressive prosecutor might build a case on the federal tor166
ture statute.
But this prosecutor would be charting new territory.
So far, no one has been convicted under the torture statute for conspiracy to torture. Potential charges under the torture statute would
also open up a range of possible defenses. The indicted defendants,
still reading from the disavowed John Yoo playbook, might argue that
167
they did not have the specific intent necessary to trigger the statute.
Or they might say their actions were excused or justified. Or the defendants may go straight for jury nullification, recognizing that people who have been rendered under the label of “terrorist” do not
make appealing victims.
Such defenses compound the complications prosecutors would
face from dealing with the classified facts involved in any irregular
rendition. When the CIA operates under a blanket policy of neither
confirming nor denying the rendition program, it is impossible for
the parties in a criminal case to delve into the details of a particular
rendition without treading on secrets during discovery or trial. Al168
though the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) is designed to handle some of the complications of having classified information in a criminal case, it does not necessarily resolve everything
169
CIPA merely encourages the parties to
in the prosecutors’ favor.
161

Id.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (allowing for an individual who has aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the commission of an offense against
the United States to be punished as a principal); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (“If two or
more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States . . . and
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned.”).
163
See Michael Isikoff, Secret Memo—Send to Be Tortured, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at
7.
164
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
165
Id.
166
18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (LexisNexis 2006).
167
See Torture Memorandum, supra note 44, at 3.
168
18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2000).
169
Id.
162
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170

work toward a resolution before trial.
The executive still has difficult choices under CIPA, and the threat of graymail still lurks behind
171
For prosecutors, the CIPA precedents are not too enthe scenes.
couraging.
In the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, alleged to be part of an alQaeda conspiracy, federal prosecutors worked for over four years,
with rounds of appeals to the Fourth Circuit, before they reached the
172
In the case of Joseph Fernandez, the
penalty stage for the trial.
former head of CIA operations in Costa Rica, indicted by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh during the Iran-Contra investigation,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment because the intelligence agencies were not willing to turn over the classified information in the form that the trial court determined was
173
necessary for a fair trial.
The intelligence agencies, rather than admit that they do not
want anyone second-guessing them, or that they are sweeping dirt
under the carpet, might argue that revealing anything about an irregular rendition will pose an exceptional risk to national security. If
challenged, they might stress the importance of “liaison” with other
intelligence agencies and the need to protect “sources and methods.”
Behind the scenes, they will push the Attorney General to dismiss a
criminal prosecution.
Redress on irregular rendition will be difficult even if the action
shifts from the criminal arena to the civil arena. Instead of federal
prosecutors bringing a criminal case under the torture statute, the
plaintiffs in a civil case claiming to have been tortured might bring an
action under the CAT. These people, however, would be weighed
down by several burdens. For instance, foreign officials involved in
the torture would not likely be subject to American jurisdiction, and
170
See Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified Information Procedures Act in Criminal Cases: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 193–
94 (1994).
171
Graymail is defined as the “[t]hreat by a defendant in a trial to expose intelligence activities or other classified information if prosecuted.” NORMAN POLMAR &
THOMAS B. ALLEN, SPY BOOK—THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE 274 (2d ed. 2004)
(1997).
172
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
931 (2005). Moussaoui was indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia in 2001. Id.
After his case made two trips to the Fourth Circuit, Moussaoui pleaded guilty to all
the charges against him in 2005. Neil A. Lewis, Surprise Terror Plea Leaves Unresolved
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at 130. The penalty stage in his case did not begin
until 2006. Neil A. Lewis, One Verdict Decided, 9/11 Jury Faces Second, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2005, at A18.
173
United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 164 (4th Cir. 1990).
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American officials might benefit from substantive and procedural
protections (e.g. qualified immunity) under the law.
Although CIPA does not burden civil plaintiffs, they are still no
match for an executive branch whose goal is to keep them from prying into secrets. A civil action related to an irregular rendition might
174
fail in the end for lack of justiciability. One reason is that the negotiations between intelligence services on an irregular rendition may
constitute the sort of “political question” which courts tend to avoid
175
resolving.
Moreover, a civil action related to an irregular rendition may be
176
dismissed because of the state secrets privilege.
That privilege can
prevent plaintiffs from learning more about irregular renditions, the
177
In
sort of “black” operations which courts are loath to disclose.
general, even if the United States is not a party to the civil suit, the
executive may assert its evidentiary privilege by intervening in the
case for that limited purpose. All the executive needs to do, either as
a third party that has intervened or as a defendant, is to have the
head of an executive agency—the Director of Central Intelligence,
for instance—file something with the court that articulates a danger
178
to national security if the case proceeds.
The court, in response to
a reasonable assertion of the state secrets privilege, must carve out of
the case whatever relates to classified information, limiting discovery

174
See Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753, 755 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (dismissing action to recover for losses arising out of the
USS Vincennes’ shooting down of an Iranian airliner)).
175
Under the political question doctrine, courts will not decide matters “where
there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it. . . . ’” Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
176
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). A state secret has been defined
as “a governmental secret relating to the national defense or the international relations of the United States.” 228 FED. R. EVID. 509(a)(1) (Proposed draft 1972); see
also Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 251
(1972).
177
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1; Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390,
402 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]he court must find that the claim was asserted properly and
that there is a reasonable danger that disclosure might prejudice the national security.”); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“It is self-evident that the
disclosures sought here pose a ‘reasonable danger’ to the diplomatic and military
interests of the United States.”).
178
See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1 (holding that the Federal Government could
invoke state secrets privilege to keep Air Force report classified); Halkin, 598 F.2d at
7 (permitting the government to not disclose whether intelligence information in
dispute even existed, as the “state secrets privilege is absolute.”).
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and further inquiry. If a carving out is not possible, the court must
179
close the case down completely.
The political question doctrine and the state secrets privilege are
not the only obstacles plaintiffs must surmount because irregular
rendition, as defined in this Article, has been practiced on non-U.S.
citizens or “aliens.” Therefore, to assess the potential for civil suits,
one should consider what access, if any, aliens have to courts.
It is possible for aliens to bring lawsuits against United States of180
ficials for treaty violations.
Under the CAT, however, the United
States specifically precludes any civil action for acts of torture outside
181
its territory. Further, the federal torture statute contains an explicit
182
Finally, aliens will not fare much better
preclusion of civil liability.
in international tribunals. The United States does not consider itself
subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with
183
respect to the CAT, and the chances are slim that the United States
would consent to jurisdiction on a specific case of irregular rendition.
The equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” may also deprive
184
Lest we forget, the subsome aliens of access to American courts.
jects of irregular rendition are said to be terrorists. One court has already denied relief to an alien under the CAT because he was found
185
Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Reform
to be involved in terrorism.
and Restructuring Act of 1998 reiterates the United States policy of

179

See Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1364–65 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
180
See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (specifying that federal courts
have jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens committed in violation of a treaty or international law); John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International
Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 29 (1999) (explaining that the United States has had the most extensive experience with civil suits
filed against individuals based on the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act).
181
See United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note
71 (noting in Understanding Three that the United States does not view the Convention as requiring an extra-territorial private right of action for damages).
182
18 U.S.C. § 2340B (2000) (“Nothing in this chapter shall . . . be construed as
creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any
civil proceeding.”).
183
See United States Convention Against Torture Ratification History, supra note
71 (noting in Reservation Three that the United States does not consider itself
bound by the Convention's Article 30(1))
184
The unclean hands doctrine is “[t]he principle that a party cannot seek equitable relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has violated an equitable principle, such as good faith.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (8th ed. 2004).
185
8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (LexisNexis 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(d)(3)
(2000); Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 857 (9th Cir. 2004).
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precluding those aliens who pose a danger to the United States from
186
the protections of the CAT.
Undeterred by such obstacles, an alien who has been subject to
irregular rendition might still be tempted to file a complaint in federal court. Proof that people have acted on this temptation comes
from two different lawsuits, one filed by Khaled El-Masri, the other by
187
Maher Arar. At least three causes of action might seem promising
188
to such plaintiffs. First, they might rely on the Alien Tort Statute.
189
Second, they might use the Torture Victim Protection Act.
Third,
190
No matter how they frame their
they might file a Bivens action.
complaints, however, their lawsuits are likely to be dismissed.
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) was passed to anchor our new
191
nation in the international community. This statute gives American
courts jurisdiction over some violations of the law of nations and
192
some treaty obligations.
The second prong to jurisdiction, namely
treaty obligations, does not seem as relevant to irregular renditions
since the United States, as noted, has precluded civil actions that
stem from violations of the torture statute and from violations of the
193
CAT that occur outside the United States. Thus, further analysis of
186

Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, at § 2243(c), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (1998).
187
Khaled El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
188
See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 108, (alleging that action is
brought directly under “treaty law”); Complaint at 4, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437
F.Supp.2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05 CV 01417), available at
http://www.acluva.org/docket/pleadings/elmasri_complaint.pdf (alleging jurisdiction and claim under Alien Tort Statute. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350
(LexisNexis 2006).
189
See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 108 (also alleging that action is brought “pursuant to the Torture Victim Prevention Act”); see Torture Victim
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
190
See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 108 (also alleging that action is brought directly under the Fifth Amendment); Complaint at 4, El-Masri v.
Tenet, supra note 188 (similar Fifth Amendment claim); see Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (holding
that a violation of constitutional rights can give rise to a damages action against the
offending federal officials even in the absence of a statute authorizing such relief,
unless “special factors counseling hesitation” or an explicit congressional declaration
of another exclusive remedy exists).
191
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722 n.15 (2004).
192
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States.”).
193
The plaintiff could attempt to limit the civil action preclusion under the CAT
in at least two ways. First, he could distinguish the preclusion on torture claims from
decisions related to rendition. Second, he could argue that the violation of Article
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irregular rendition focuses mainly on the first prong: violations of the
law of nations.
The “law of nations” referred to in the ATS encompasses at least
a “modest number” of violations that were accepted at common law
194
in 1789 as violations of international norms. In short, the ATS is set
within an eighteenth-century paradigm. According to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation, Congress created causes of action against piracy, against interfering with ambassadors, and against violating
195
norms of “safe conduct.”
Beyond that, there has been a great debate about whether common law torts have evolved since the ATS was
196
In any event, torture may have been included in the
adopted.
modest number of violations already accepted at common law or may
now qualify within the evolved purposes of the ATS.
The ATS did not receive much attention until 1980, when the
197
Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
The Filartiga court
stated that, for purposes of the ATS, the law of nations had evolved
198
beyond the common law in 1789. Accordingly, the court allowed a
Paraguayan citizen to sue another Paraguayan citizen in the United
199
In esStates for acts of alleged torture that occurred in Paraguay.
sence, the United States provided a forum to address atrocities that
violated jus cogens, even though the United States had no other inter200
But Filartiga, limited to its facts, did not rule
est in the case.
whether a similar action could be brought against United States citizens and officials, whether American torturers are the modern
equivalent of pirates and slave traders.

Three occurred inside the United States, say, at CIA headquarters for its role in the
rendition.
194
See, e.g., Debra A. Harvey, The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights
Watchdog, or Simply ‘Historical Trivia’?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 344–45 (1988)
(“Generally, the courts have defined the Law of Nations as practices which, over a
long period of time, have evolved into consensual and universal behavioral expectations among civilized societies.”).
195
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
196
See generally Gene Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 193,
247–50 (2005).
197
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
198
Id. at 881.
199
Id. at 889.
200
Id. at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the
pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.
Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free
all people from brutal violence.”).
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There may be a difference in the treatment of an official who
himself tortures versus an official who renders a person to another
country where he is tortured. Concerning the latter category of officials, there may also be a difference in the shock to international
norms from a deliberate violation of Article Three of the CAT and an
irregular rendition where torture occurs even though the senders put
in place careful assurances and substantial post-transfer oversight.
The knowing violation, in any case, is more egregious than the careless one.
The Supreme Court in 2004 provided more guidance on the
201
In that case, the Ninth Circuit had
ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
stated that the ATS “creates a cause of action for an alleged violation
202
of the law of nations,” ruling that “arbitrary arrest and detention”
203
Although the Supreme
can be characterized as such a violation.
Court struck down the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of the
ATS, it recognized “that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms to204
day.”
The Supreme Court was cautious. Absent a clear legislative
mandate, it recommended against defining new causes of action un205
Since Sosa, the ATS is not as likely
der an evolving law of nations.
to apply to arrests and detentions. The door is not open to such actions. Even so, because Sosa is tied to the specific facts of the case, the
door has not been necessarily shut on all scenarios related to irregular rendition.
In 1991 the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) was added
to the ATS as part of the codification of the CAT into United States
206
law.
The TVPA’s clear purpose is to establish a civil action for
207
Indeed, the Court in
someone who has been subject to torture.
Sosa spoke of TVPA as a “clear mandate” for making torture action208
able under the law of nations.
The definitions of torture in the
TVPA correspond with the definitions in the CAT; if anything, the
209
TVPA’s definitions are more specific and illustrative.
Therefore, a
201

542 U.S. 692 (2004).
Id. at 699 (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 641 (9th Cir.
2003)).
203
Id. (citing Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620).
204
Id. at 729.
205
Id. at 727.
206
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 1 (1991).
207
See Torture Victim Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1350, n. § 2 (LexisNexis
2005).
208
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004).
209
Torture Memorandum, supra note 44, at 22–23.
202
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suspect who has been rendered inconsistent with the CAT might find
hope in the TVPA. While redress is possible through the TVPA, the
United States is presumed to have sovereign immunity unless a stat210
ute provides an express waiver. The TVPA mentions actions under
the “color of law, of any foreign nation” but does not refer to actions
211
under American law or to actions against United States officials.
There is scant indication, if any, of a waiver of sovereign immunity.
212
Schneider v. Kissinger is an important case concerning immunity
under the TVPA. In that case, relatives of an assassinated Chilean
general sued Henry Kissinger, former National Security Adviser and
former Secretary of State, for his alleged involvement in the assassina213
tion.
Before dismissing the case as a political question, the court
noted that “[t]he TVPA imposes civil liability only on an individual
acting ‘under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.’ In carrying out the direct orders of the President of the
United States, Dr. Kissinger was most assuredly acting pursuant to
214
By the Schneider logic, American officials who act under
U.S. law.”
orders on irregular renditions seem to be protected from suit under
the TVPA. Therefore, unless a plaintiff demonstrates that a United
States official (for example, an official in the intelligence community’s National Clandestine Service) acted outside the scope of his authority and “under the color of foreign law,” it will be difficult for the
plaintiff to succeed under the TVPA. That is, simply because an official made a mistake in assessing the likelihood of torture in a receiving country does not necessarily entitle the rendered suspect to damages.
Finally, a Bivens action is possible when a federal official, operating under color of law or legal authority, deprives a person of a con215
stitutional right.
There are some situations where this sort of action might apply to irregular rendition. For instance, a United States
citizen or a resident alien might be seized on American soil and rendered without any process. That seizure might be construed as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment or as a violation of due
216
process under the Fifth Amendment. Or the torture of a citizen or

210

See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, n. §2.
212
310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
213
Id. at 253
214
Id. at 267 (citation omitted).
215
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 409–10 (1971).
216
U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
211
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a resident alien might be construed as cruel and unusual punishment
217
These scenarios, however,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
are outside the scope of this Article. Within scope are scenarios in
which a foreign citizen is snatched from a foreign jurisdiction and
taken to another foreign jurisdiction. In such scenarios, foreign citizens are much less likely than American citizens to have due process
and other constitutional rights. Even if torture is alleged, at least one
circuit has stated that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the
treatment of non-U.S. citizens by officials who are not from the
218
This statement stands true even where the alleged
United States.
mistreatment (torture of a Guatemalan rebel by Guatemalan forces)
219
was at the behest of the CIA.
III.

ASSURANCES AS REMEDY

The United States should comply with the rule of law for its own
sake. Such compliance is separate from any redress that improperly
rendered persons may have in American courts. As far as compliance
with Article Three of the CAT, assurances from receiving countries
serve as one of two broad avenues in the direction of legality.
The United States does not need to be too concerned about ir220
regular renditions to countries such as Switzerland.
Assurances
about the proper treatment of rendered suspects are not necessary
from these countries. If we asked the Swiss for assurances, for instance, they might lecture us about our abuses at Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo because a request for such assurances would suggest
that we maintain higher human rights standards than they do. With
countries at the other end of the spectrum from Switzerland, no matter what assurances we receive, no matter what monitoring we believe
we are putting in place, the United States should remain concerned
about torture and, hence, reluctant to render. Returning an Iraqi
dissident to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as described in the Iraqi lion’s
den scenario, is an obvious example. No combination of assurances
and monitoring would make that rendition legal. There would still
be substantial grounds for believing that the suspect would be tortured upon transfer.
Even after the extremes are lopped off, many situations are left
in the middle. Until a presidential administration adopts a blanket
217

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602–03 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
219
Id.
220
See infra, Part V.
218
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policy against all irregular renditions, the situations in the middle
must be considered. Accordingly, assurances from the receiving
countries could play a significant role in determining the legality of
irregular rendition.
On several occasions, the Bush Administration has noted that assurances affect its decisions on transfers of prisoners. The United
States, although careful not to mention any details about CIA activities, stated in its Second Periodic Report to the Committee Against
Torture that assurances sometimes play into the balance of whether
221
to transfer a person to another government.
Before that, embroiled in the allegations about secret CIA prisons in Europe, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in 2005 that “[w]here appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons will
222
Similarly, in 2003, the Department of Defense’s
not be tortured.”
General Counsel said that “United States policy is to obtain specific
assurances from the receiving country that it will not torture the indi223
vidual being transferred to that country.”
The assurances, of course, must be reliable and must be made in
224
good faith to have any value in the calculations under the CAT. In
some cases, as a counter-weight to the possibility of torture in a receiving country, assurances may tip the balance toward legality. The
more reliable the assurances and the more detailed they are, the
more the balance tips toward legal rendition.
The President could make a policy decision not to render terrorism suspects to questionable countries. All close calls could be handled by a default decision not to render. Not rendering on close calls
could become part of a retrenchment of CIA practices, which may
have begun with the Detainee Treatment Act that precludes coercive
225
interrogations by all United States personnel.
Precluding some ir221
Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee
Against Torture, Annex 1, Part One, Section II, D, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
45738.htm#annexes (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
222
Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
2005, at A01.
223
Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, June 25, 2003, in 150 CONG. REC. S781-03, S783 (Feb. 10,
2004).
224
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 321 (1987) (requiring international agreements to be made in good faith, although the importance of this requirement is not necessarily clear).
225
Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005,
at A1. (Sen. Lindsey O. Graham said, “McCain’s amendment needs to be part of the
overall package, because it deals with standardizing interrogation techniques and will
reestablish moral high ground for the United States.”).
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regular renditions may indeed be a reasonable policy; but that does
not seem to be the current policy. That is not the easy way out from
the middle.
A. The Person Behind the Assurance
The highest assurances come from heads of state in foreign jurisdictions about to take control of suspects. Diplomatic protocol
would call for the President of the United States to ask for such assurances. President Bush, however, may not be interested in such details or he may choose not to use political capital in asking for assur226
ances from other leaders.
Accordingly, assurances from heads of
state may not always be realistic.
Even if heads of state are willing to give assurances, regardless of
who asks for them, such assurances could be less valuable than assurances from lower-level officials. The head of state, after all, does not
handle day-to-day details in the prison or detention facility. In addition, the security services of the receiving country (that is, the people
in the room with the rendered suspect) may keep secrets from their
leader. In short, gaps may exist between authority and control.
The process of asking for and obtaining assurances involves international relations between the sending country and the receiving
country. Just so, American diplomats might seek assurances from
their diplomatic counterparts, probably in the receiving country’s
227
ministry of foreign affairs.
The highest assurances, in diplomatic
rank, would come from the foreign minister. Further, assurances
from an ambassador to the United States may have the same (or similar) value as assurances given by a foreign minister. The ambassador’s posting to Washington is often a plum assignment, a step or so
away from becoming foreign minister. Most foreign countries also
have diplomats of an intermediate rank, such as the deputy foreign
minister, who may provide reliable assurances.
The diplomatic track, though, has drawbacks. The United States
Department of State probably does not hold the terrorism suspects
who are being considered for irregular rendition; the State Depart226

These are more than theoretical possibilities since the Bush Administration has
not stated that it has ended the practice of irregular rendition.
227
Samuel M. Witten, Deputy Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, Written
Declaration on U.S. Practices on Diplomatic Assurances at 6, Cornejo-Barreto v.
Seifert, Case No. 01-cv-662-AHS, (C. D. Cal. October 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16513.pdf. (asserting, inter alia, that
“the Secretary might condition the extradition on the requesting State’s provision of
assurances related to torture”).
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ment is not a bureau of prisons. Control of the suspects lies elsewhere—probably with employees and contractors of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the Department of
Justice. For this reason, negotiations that the State Department leads
may not affect actual control of the suspects. As an alternative, the
process of obtaining assurances from foreign countries that they will
not engage in torture should be consolidated with actual control of
the suspect. For example, if the CIA is about to transfer a suspect to a
Bulgarian intelligence service, the negotiation should be between the
liaison services instead of between diplomats. The fears of torture, in
the end, relate less to the conduct of Bulgarian diplomats than to the
conduct of Bulgarian police and security officers.
In most parts of the world, diplomats and spymasters usually operate in separate tracks. But sometimes the lines between diplomacy
228
and espionage do blur.
In general, the diplomats deal in open
policies while spymasters gather secrets and conduct covert actions.
229
Our State Department, unlike the CIA, holds a daily press briefing.
Further, intelligence officers, unlike diplomats, are accustomed to
joint operations and to trading information with officers from other
intelligence services. Rendition deals, that is, the trading and transferring of suspects, can be built on a mutual respect among professionals.
The techniques to espionage, what spymasters call “tradecraft,”
are similar around the world. Everybody does surveillance. Everybody does counter-surveillance. Everybody tries to gather intelligence from human assets, including officers in opposing services.
Everybody performs counter-intelligence against penetrations into
the home service. Spymasters, the world around, understand each
other. So, on irregular renditions of terrorism suspects, the negotiations might be conducted between the intelligence services—the
handlers of human assets. This is an example of simple symmetry between two groups. If the suspect is in joint control between United
228
Diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention may protect them. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 9, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 241. If they are revealed as spies, they can be declared persona non grata
and returned to their home country, but not prosecuted by the country that revealed
them. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 80

(1965).
229

United States Department of State, Daily Press Briefings, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ (last visited March 23, 2006) (“The State Department Spokesman, or the alternate, generally briefs the State Department press
corps on the record, on camera each workday afternoon in the Carl T. Rowan Press
Briefing Room, room 2209 in the Harry S. Truman building of the U.S. Department
of State.”).
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States agencies (say, between the CIA and DOD), and is destined for
joint control in a foreign jurisdiction (say, between the intelligence
and law enforcement arms), all parties to the trade should be at the
table. Thus, the symmetry becomes more complicated. No matter
the level of complexity, if the assurances on irregular renditions are
to be effective, they should be integrated into relevant chains of
command in the sending and receiving countries. Moreover, the CIA
might gather intelligence through secret means to test the sincerity of
those foreign officials who give the assurances. So much is possible.
B. The Form of the Assurance
In some foreign jurisdictions, officials may not hesitate to put
their assurances about the proper treatment of a prisoner in writing.
The record for their assurances could come under one of many labels: a letter, a demarche, or a memorandum of understanding.
Whatever the label, both sides to the rendition, the sending and receiving jurisdictions, would thereby have a copy of the deal. The written record would remind the parties of the solemnity of the understanding: entrusting the care of a human being from one jurisdiction
to another.
But some foreign jurisdictions may not be willing to put any230
thing in writing. The reason may be cultural or political.
Or, officials may fear leaks from their side. Or, officials may prefer not to
have an official record in case a scandal later arises. In any event,
when the preferences are against a written record, the assurances
might come orally in a meeting between an American official and an
official from the other jurisdiction. Their “meeting” could be in person, over the telephone, or by e-mail. The variations are endless.
Differences in details may or may not affect the value of the assurances. The differences between fountain pens and computers, so
to speak, may be more style than substance. Yet, even when assurances from the other jurisdiction are strictly oral, the American official will almost surely, after the meeting, make an internal record of
231
those assurances within the United States Government. The notion

230
For example, on March 22, 1999 the Egyptian Minister of the Interior rejected
a British request for written assurances arguing that they would “constitute an interference in the scope [of] the Egyptian judicial system and an infringement on Egyptian national sovereignty.” See Statewatch.org, U.K.: Egyptian National ‘Unlawfully Detained’ After Intervention of Prime Minister, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/
nov/03blair.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
231
This assumes the United States officials would not be secretly recording the
meeting.
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of a gentleman’s agreement between intelligence services, where
nothing is ever written down by either side, fits the fantasy of spy novels but not the international practice of espionage. The spymasters,
like the diplomats and the lawyers, create piles of paper. The internal record on a rendition deal could be filed under many labels: a
cable, a memorandum for the record, or a letter of understanding.
Whatever the label for the written record and whether or not the
writer is an American diplomat, a defense official, or an intelligence
official, the internal record will probably be distributed among
232
United States agencies on a “distribution list” in the government. A
copy of the record will probably go to staffers at the National Security
Council (“NCS”), including the NSC’s legal adviser. Rendition, so
practiced, falls within the NSC’s statutory task of integrating domes233
Depending on the NSC’s relatic, foreign, and military policies.
tionship with the White House, particularly the relationship between
the National Security Adviser and the President, a copy of the written
record may also go to the White House counsel and to the President
himself. That said, the White House may prefer not to receive any
copies. Along the lines of the Iran-Contra operations, the White
House may use the NSC as a buffer for legal and political protection
so policymakers stay untarnished by the rough and tumble of what
goes on in the field. Policymakers might be “informed” by word of
mouth in the corridors of power rather than by paper, thus building
into the process of irregular rendition some plausible deniability as to
234
details.
Nothing in a statute, case law, or an international convention
specifically addresses the legality of the range of assurances for an irregular rendition. Plus, the scholarship, until now, has not reached
the differences in weight between written assurances and oral assurances. Assurances under Article Three of the CAT are not controlled
by incorporation clauses, the parol evidence rule, or other familiar
concepts of domestic contract law. Accordingly, assurances on ir232
But it is possible that a United States agency involved in renditions may insist
on “compartmenting” the information from all other agencies. In any event, the
Department of Education probably does not need to be on the distribution.
233
The National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. ch. 15 (2000)); 50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6); 50
U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)-(5).
234
It is reported that President Bush instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, not to tell him the locations of secret detainees so that it would
not affect his interactions with representatives from those countries. See James Risen
et al., Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited in Top Qaeda Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2004,
at A1 (noting that the CIA searched for remote sites in friendly countries, and was
allowed to use them without any outside scrutiny).
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regular renditions fall within a body of law at the fringes of or beyond
contract law.
American contract law, while not controlling, provides a framework for analyzing assurances on possible renditions. The Statute of
Frauds requires some contracts, such as those which cannot be per235
formed within one year, to be in writing.
The primary purpose of
the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraudulent claims from being enforced, but it also has the secondary effect of ensuring that the parties
enumerate their terms fully and act cautiously in making their
236
Similar purposes lead toward a preference for written assurdeals.
ances on irregular renditions under Article Three of the CAT. Some
detentions may last for more than a year after irregular rendition,
and officials on the sending and receiving ends of irregular rendition
should enumerate their terms and act cautiously.
Contract law is not alone in preferring the written record. When
an executive agency conducts covert action, American law requires
237
Presidential authorization to be stated in a written “finding.”
A
covert action, usually conducted by the CIA, is an activity that is intended to influence political, economic, or military conditions
238
The requirement of a
abroad while hiding the government’s role.
written finding on covert action is extra evidence of a preference for
the written over the oral record on intelligence activities. For irregular rendition, as a sort of covert action, the assurances should also be
in writing.
In American business, it is standard practice in negotiating and
drafting contracts to include a merger clause. That clause consolidates all prior understandings, written and oral, into the written con239
tract that the parties are signing.
A standard merger clause might
read: “It is expressly agreed by the parties to this contract that the
contract constitutes the entire and only contract between the parties
and that any previous agreement . . . is of no effect and shall not be
240
To
considered in the interpretation of the terms of this contract.”
the extent that lawyers involved in irregular rendition have had
commercial experience before joining the government—a likely possibility—their rendition deals may reflect commercial practices. They
235

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110(1)(e) (1981).
9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21:1 (2005).
237
50 U.S.C.S. § 413b(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
238
I have assumed that irregular rendition per se does not fit within the definition
of covert action.
239
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210.
240
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 4th Forms § 33F:1.
236
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may use merger clauses and other provisions that are standard in
American contracts.
The commercial analogy may also explain the attitude of American principals to rendition deals. Some clients in the government
may react to all the law and legal analysis like clients in the corporate
world. Just as principals to commercial deals accuse their lawyers of
creating far too much paper, intelligence officers on irregular rendition deals may accuse their government lawyers of making everything
241
far too complicated.
C. Publicizing the Receiving Countries
Except for isolated comments by a few officials, the Bush Ad242
ministration has not said much about irregular rendition. Our government still does not discuss whether specific persons have been
rendered or whether specific jurisdictions have received renditions
from the United States. As a change, the government should reveal
to the public those countries that are possible recipients of rendered
suspects. This would make the government more accountable, while
not involving the courts through regular rendition or extradition. To
relieve some of the public’s legitimate concern about the dirtiness of
irregular rendition, the government should also reveal those countries, for foreign policy reasons or for reasons under the CAT, that
have been ruled out as rendition sites. This would make the government more accountable and would educate the public and American
allies about an important tactic in American counter-terrorism.
Government officials, of course, may argue that revelations will
complicate our foreign relations, breaching promises of secrecy they
have made to other governments that cooperate with us in counterterrorism. Their arguments would not be completely unreasonable.
For example, if Jordan has taken renditions from us and if we shine a
spotlight on them, it is almost certain that Jordan would cease or
lessen its cooperation because of the potential backlash by antiAmerican portions in the Jordanian public. The stakes on irregular
rendition are high. As a State Department official declared about
transfers from Guantanamo: “Later review in a public forum of the

241

See DUANE R. CLARRIDGE, A SPY FOR ALL SEASONS 184 (1997) (“In the last few
years, the Agency had been infested with lawyers and second-guessed and pilloried in
hindsight by doughfaces ignorant of what espionage and covert action are all
about.”).
242
While answering questions about the mistaken abduction of El-Masri, Condoleezza Rice answered, “when and if mistakes are made, we work very hard and as
quickly a possible to rectify them.” Kessler, supra note 106, at A18.
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Department’s dealings with a particular foreign government regarding transfer matters would seriously undermine our ability to investigate allegations of mistreatment or torture that come to our attention
and to reach acceptable accommodations with other governments to
243
address those important concerns.”
There is a way, however, to balance our commitments to cooperating governments while generating useful debate on which countries
should be potential recipients of rendered suspects. In a welcome
spurt of modesty, the Bush Administration should open up the debate and recognize that its officials and lawyers do not have all the
answers. As with the handling of most legal issues, the administration’s analysis would benefit from more interaction with scholars and
the public. The administration should move from secrecy toward
transparency.
If Jordan cooperates with the United States behind the scenes,
our government could mention Jordan in a list of jurisdictions, some
of which the administration knows are cooperating, some of which
are not. Because Jordan would be mixed into a group of other countries, it would not have complete anonymity. Since the United States
Government would not be acknowledging that Jordan is cooperating
for sure, the damage to Jordan would not be significantly greater
than the damage that may have already occurred through leaks and
rumors. The process would be controlled. The improvement in the
quality of our rendition decisions and in America’s standing in the
world would more than outweigh the nuisance to Jordan. The debate
is something Jordanian officials should realize is in their own interest.
The value of the debate is something American officials can stress to
them.
On a middle road, this Article is part of a process of pressuring
our government to be more forthcoming about important issues of
national security. Since September 11, there has been one occasion
when lobbying created a better balance between the efficacy of intelligence operations and the public’s right to be informed. Until the
9/11 Commission was about to publish its report, the Bush Administration had neither confirmed nor denied that a few “high-value detainees” were being held in secret locations. Lobbied by the Commis-

243
Declaration of Pierre-Richard Prosper at 7, Abdah v. Bush,
No.
CIVA041254(HHK)(RMC)
(D.C.
Cir.
2005),
available
at
http://www.justicescholars.org/pegc/archive/Paracha_v_Bush/govt_opp_20050422
_ex_D.pdf#search=%22declaration%20Prosper%20Mahmoad%20Abdah%20v.%20B
ush%22.

RADSANFINAL.DOC

52

10/20/2006 2:06:56 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1
244

sion and by the public, the Bush Administration finally relented.
The government confirmed the names of ten detainees, including
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”), the alleged mastermind of the
245
Since then, no damage to national security
September 11 attacks.
has occurred from admitting ten names in a footnote to a public
document. Indeed, on September 6, 2006, President Bush announced the transfer of KSM and thirteen other secret detainees to
246
Guantanamo.
Even without pressure, the Bush Administration sometimes
changes its mind about what must be classified and what can be released to the public. Our country has a process for declassifying in247
formation.
When it suited the Bush Administration, the White
House sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to the United Nations to
make the case for war against Iraq. At the United Nations, Powell
had been entrusted with intercepts and other sensitive bits of information, true or not, declassified days before the presentation to the
248
Since our government does not always clench its
Security Council.
fists on the secrets, some hope exists for a better balance on irregular
rendition.
D. The Specificity of Assurances
Assurances stretch over a range of specificity. In a general assurance, the receiving country states that it understands its obligations
under the CAT and agrees to comply with them. That assurance
could be written in one sentence. In a specific assurance, a list of
prohibited tactics could be attached. That assurance might take several pages, including attachments. For example, even if the sending
and receiving countries cannot agree on whether water-boarding
constitutes torture under the CAT, the sending country could ask the
receiving country not to engage in that practice. All other things being equal, the more specific the assurances, the more worthwhile they
are under Article Three of the CAT.

244

See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 146.
See id.
246
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Threats and Responses: The Overview; President Moves 14 Held
in Secret to Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1.
247
The most recent Executive Order on classification procedures, Executive Order No. 13292, directs the declassification of information that is not exempt from
search and review under sections 105c, 105d, or 701 of the National Security Act of
1947. Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003).
248
See Dana Priest, Telling Secrets: Not Just What, But How; Speech Is Revealing on
Gathering Intelligence, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2003, at A23.
245
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E. Repeat Renditions
Prior renditions are a key factor in assessing additional renditions to a country. If the United States concludes that a problem
country complied with its assurances—not torturing the suspect—it is
more likely, if nothing else has changed, that the next rendition to
249
the country will be legal with assurances. On the other hand, if the
United States has indications that the problem country did not comply with the assurances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for repeat
renditions to comply with the law. The greater the deviation between
what was called for in the assurances and what occurred in practice,
the more significant the problem under Article Three of the CAT.
One credible case of torture, contrary to assurances, might be
enough to turn gray into black. Additional renditions, even with
multiple assurances, might present substantial grounds for believing
that torture would occur.
250
In theory, the taint from prior renditions does not last forever.
In practice, the country could take actions to return toward the white.
Yet, for the near term in which American counter-terrorism policies
take place, any country painted black should be out of bounds for irregular rendition.
Another factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis might
be the experience that countries other than the United States—
perhaps Canada and the United Kingdom—have had with a particular receiving country on irregular renditions. The official communications, whether between diplomats or spymasters, on comparative
experiences can be kept secret. Accordingly, Canadian and British
officials may be more frank with American officials than with Human
Rights Watch on whether a receiving country has honored its assurances on past renditions. There are things, good and bad, that the
public does not always know.
Up until now, the literature on irregular rendition devotes little
attention to the situation where the United States reasonably believes
that the rendition is legal, but, after transfer, reasonably concludes
that the receiving country has strayed into torture. To comply with
treaty obligations in such a situation, the United States must insist
249

Indeed, if a country complies with assurances on several cases a point might be
reached when assurances are no longer necessary.
250
Just as immigration law has reclassified countries which require protection under the CAT, it is likely that any classification for irregular rendition may change depending on country conditions. See Kourteva v. I.N.S., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (government shift in Bulgaria from communists to socialistdemocrats prevented CAT from prohibiting transfer of alien).
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that the torture cease or must do everything possible for the suspect
to be returned to the United States or to another country where the
suspect will not be tortured. Preferably, the suspect will be returned
to a country like Switzerland. Such situations are another one of
those gray areas, which must exist in practice, but are ignored by the
black and white of many comments on irregular rendition.
IV.

MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT

Besides assurances of proper treatment of prisoners by receiving
countries, other measures help tilt toward legality on close calls of irregular rendition. One important measure is the willingness of a receiving country to allow post-transfer monitoring and oversight by
251
United States officials or third-parties.
The relevant standard under the CAT, so often repeated, is whether it is more likely than not
252
that a rendered suspect will be tortured in the receiving country.
As a part of a rendition deal, the United States could insist that monitoring and oversight take place after the transfer. If the receiving
country agrees to monitoring and oversight, that lowers the perceived
253
After transfer of the suspect, the receiving counodds of torture.
try’s abiding by the agreement on monitoring and oversight continues as a back-end factor of legality and loops back as a front-end factor for additional renditions. After transfer, the CIA might even use
secret means to ensure that the receiving country is keeping its end
of the rendition deal. The secret means could complement the open
means of monitoring and oversight.
Monitoring and oversight could take two basic forms. First, the
receiving country might accept visits from human observers. These
observers could be American citizens or citizens from other countries. Candidates should include the Red Cross and other reputable
non-governmental organizations. Second, the receiving country
might accept technical oversight. Going beyond the obligations of
the CAT, this oversight could involve detailed logs, giving the times
and locations of the interrogations, and could include video and audio recordings of the interrogations themselves.
251

Contrary to the Human Rights Watch position on monitoring and assurances,
see text accompanying notes 145–46 supra, an acquiescence in post-transfer monitoring by a receiving country lends weight to, rather than demonstrates the inadequacy
of, an assurance.
252
See supra. Part II.B
253
The monitoring and oversight I have in mind is significant enough to make a
difference under Article Three of the CAT, but not so extensive that the suspect effectively remains in American custody and control, subject to constitutional and
statutory protections that may go beyond Article Three.
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Like assurances, monitoring and oversight operate on a sliding
scale. Monitoring and oversight are not necessary for renditions to
Switzerland. At the other end of the scale, monitoring and oversight
will not legalize renditions of notorious Iraqi defectors to Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. In the gray zone, however, monitoring and oversight
do make a difference. The closer the call, the more that monitoring
and oversight become necessary.
A full analysis of each form of monitoring and oversight provides
enough content for a separate law review article. In this respect, the
analysis is like opening boxes within boxes. But without opening too
many boxes, without raising too many questions, I can make some
general comments. As to monitoring, the sending country should be
relatively more assured if the receiving country agrees that a thirdparty inspection team may have unfettered and unaccompanied access to the suspect held in the receiving country’s facility. Independent parties have more value than inspectors who are accompanied at
all times by the authorities from the receiving country. In addition,
the less notice the receiving country requires for the inspection, the
more the sending country should be reassured. On the other hand, a
rule need not be adopted that accompanied access or a long period
of advanced notice per se makes the assurances and the monitoring
unacceptable under the CAT. Again, the analysis is specific to the
facts on a totality of the circumstances.
Most would agree that third-party monitoring and oversight
from organizations such as the Red Cross have more value, in reaching legality, than oversight from United States officials. Oversight
from the Red Cross is worth more because its representatives are neutral and because it has no stake in the “intelligence take” from the
suspect. To assuage any concerns the Bush Administration has about
protecting classified information related to renditions, it may insist
that the Red Cross officials sign confidentiality agreements or obtain
security clearances, or both. That would not be unreasonable.
As to technical oversight, the more intrusive the methods, the
more value they have in reaching legality. Videos show more angles
than still photographs. Video recordings with sound give a more
complete record than a sole audio recording. Five cameras in the interrogation room show more details than one camera.
But too much faith should not be placed in technology. Even
with cameras all over the interrogation booth, the suspect could be
tortured elsewhere. In horrible situations, the torturers might instruct the suspect outside the booth that if he mentions anything
about the torture when they are on camera, the treatment off camera
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will become even worse. Such threats can also undercut the effectiveness of third-party oversight. When the suspect is so broken—
when the suspect becomes a slave to his masters—the interrogations
254
can be conducted without any signs of torture.
That is a nightmare.
The nightmare is that the rule of law, including assurances and
monitoring, only goes so far in preventing and ferreting out evil.
That the rule of law has limits does not mean that practitioners and
policymakers on irregular rendition have descended into an abyss.
What it means is that they must continue to struggle, inch by inch,
measure by measure, to stay out of the underworld. As much as possible, professional observers, aided by first-hand observations and by
technology, must look beyond the obvious for more subtle signs of
torture. They must look closer at the receiving country’s specific
practices.
V

CATEGORIES OF COUNTRIES

Irregular renditions can go to many places other than Swiss safe
havens and Iraqi lion’s dens. On renditions for intelligence purposes, at least three variables exist. First, the suspect may be rendered back to his country of origin (defined by citizenship or by residency). Or the suspect may be rendered to a third country. This
variable is binary. Second, the receiving country may be a signatory
of the CAT. Or the country may not be. This variable is also binary.
Third, one’s assessment of the receiving country’s human rights records may vary. For the sake of reasonable simplicity, the analysis
could develop three scenarios within this plane: the receiving country
could have an excellent record, an in-between record, or a very poor
record. This third variable, by definition, has three nodes.
The product of multiplying the three variables is twelve. Thus, a
thorough analysis of irregular rendition might address at least twelve
patterns. To illustrate, one pattern involves a rendition to a suspect’s
country of origin; the country is a member of the CAT; and the country has an excellent human rights record. That is the best pattern.
But rather than cover all patterns, one could delve into country prac-

254
See John T. Parry, What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What If We Are?, 64 U.
PITT. L. REV. 237, 248–49 (2003) (discussing the effect of “escalation” on a victim of
torture and its ability to shift responsibility for pain endured from the torturer to the
victim); see also John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should
Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743 (2002) (discussing interrogation techniques and whether the use of torture may be, in some cases, more successful than
traditional means of interrogation).
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tices. The third variable, after all, seems most relevant to Article
Three of the CAT.
Relying on Amnesty International and on the State Department,
one can divide the countries into at least three groups concerning
their treatment of detainees and their reputation for respecting hu255
man rights.
From top to bottom, three groups emerge. The human rights record for the first group is generally good, without any
reports of torture. In the words of the State Department, these governments “generally respected the human rights of [their] citi256
Irregular renditions to this group should not pose any serizens.”
ous problems. Countries in the second group have isolated instances
of mistreatment and torture, but nothing systematic. Irregular renditions to this group, while problematic, are possible with sufficient assurances and adequate monitoring and oversight. Countries in the
third group have records of abuse, including mysterious disappearances. Mistreatment and torture are routine, with confessions often
257
Irregular renditions to this group, if
obtained through beatings.
not impossible under the law, pose the greatest problems for United
States compliance with the CAT.
A. Clean Countries
In the first group, Finland is as close as a country can get to an
unblemished human rights record. Finland ratified the CAT on Au258
gust 30, 1989.
According to our State Department, there are no
259
The prisons in
indications of a Finnish official employing torture.
260
Finland’s judicial sysFinland are well run and safe for prisoners.
tem provides prisoners with ample means to present allegations of
261
abuse and to obtain redress.
But no country is perfect. Amnesty International has criticized
Finland for not having regulations on the use of force and other re262
straints when deporting foreign nationals.
Since there have not
255

These groupings are illustrative, not comprehensive.
U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Finland, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41680.htm.
257
See U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Uzbekistan, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/
41717.htm.
258
Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66.
259
2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Finland, supra note 256.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Amnesty
International,
Finland
Human
Rights
Report
2005,
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/fin-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
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been any reports of abuse, the lack of regulations is a minor defect in
Finland’s otherwise outstanding record.
Switzerland shares Finland’s record for not mistreating prisoners
263
and for protecting human rights.
Switzerland ratified the CAT on
264
Swiss prisons are adequate. There are some
December 2, 1986.
reports, however, that the police have used excessive force, especially
265
266
against foreigners.
Beyond reports of police mistreatment, Amnesty International is concerned about the Swiss police’s use of taser
267
dart-firing stun guns.
The worst reports from Switzerland concern
physical attacks against foreign nationals who refuse to leave Switzer268
land to go to their countries of origin. Yet, overall, Switzerland is a
safe place for prisoners. The odds are slim prisoners will be mistreated while in custody there.
Another country with a good record for treating prisoners is Poland. This is significant because Poland has been mentioned as a
269
place where the United States has rendered terrorism suspects. Po270
land ratified the CAT on July 26, 1989. The Polish authorities gen271
erally respect human rights. Because Poland is not as rich as other
countries in Europe, Polish prisons are poor by international standards, not matching the prisons of other countries in the first group.
Although there are concerns about the safety of prisoners from at272
tack, no incidents of torture have been reported. Amnesty International does report, however, an excessive use of force that resulted in
273
the deaths of three prisoners.
In sum, these are easy cases. Unless there are some negative circumstances connected to a particular rendition, irregular renditions
may be made to Finland, Switzerland, and Poland in compliance with
263

U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Switzerland, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41711.htm.
264
Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66.
265
2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Switzerland, supra note 263.
266
Id.
267
Amnesty International, Switzerland Human Rights Report 2005,
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/che-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
268
Id.
269
Craig Whitlock, Investigator Sees Signs of CIA Role in Abductions; Poland and Romania Queried on Prison Issue, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2005, at A21.
270
Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66.
271
U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Poland, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41701.htm.
272
Id.
273
Amnesty
International,
Poland
Human
Rights
Report
2005,
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/2eu-index-eng and http://web.amnesty.org/
report2005/pol-summary-eng (last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
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the CAT. Neither assurances nor post-transfer monitoring is necessary to reach a conclusion that the terrorism suspect will not be tortured.
B. Repeat Offenders
So many countries are in the third group—at the bottom—that
this Article can limit itself to those countries mentioned as United
States allies on counter-terrorism. Uzbekistan, for one, has an atro274
cious human rights record. Terrorism suspects, often held for long
sentences after unfair trials, suffer worse than common criminals in
275
Uzbekistan.
Torture is common in the form of beatings, suffoca276
tion, electric shock, rape, and other sexual abuses. Information obtained through torture in pretrial facilities is often used against de277
fendants at trial.
Death sentences are common, as are secret
278
The United Nations reports that torture is systematic
executions.
279
in Uzbekistan. Official Uzbek investigations into allegations of tor280
ture are neither prompt nor impartial.
Despite its poor human rights report, Uzbekistan has shown
signs of improvement. Torture is not suspected in any prison deaths,
although negligence by prison officials continues to result in
281
deaths.
To ameliorate Uzbekistan’s reputation, the Uzbek Cabinet
282
All in all, Uzof Ministers has taken steps to implement the CAT.
bekistan’s human rights record is black with some patches of white.
Egypt also has a poor human rights record. Even though the
Egyptian Constitution prohibits inflicting “physical or moral harm”
upon detainees, the use of torture and abuse by security services is
283
common. When Egypt ratified the CAT, it did so with a reservation
to Article Twenty, preventing outside observers from investigating al274

Peter Finn, Kyrgyzstan Signals Uzbek Extraditions, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at

A26.
275

Amnesty International, Uzbekistan Human Rights Report 2005,
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/uzb-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
276
U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Uzbekistan, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41717.htm.
277
Id.
278
Amnesty International Report, Uzbekistan Human Rights Report 2005, supra
note 275.
279
2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Uzbekistan, supra note 276.
280
Amnesty International Report, Uzbekistan Human Rights Report 2005, supra
note 275.
281
2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Uzbekistan, supra note 276.
282
Id.
283
U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Egypt, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm.
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284

legations of torture there.
But the United Nations Committee
Against Torture has still found a systematic pattern of abuse in
285
Torture and mistreatment are often used to extract inforEgypt.
286
mation during interrogations.
Prisoners are detained incommunicado for long periods and the authorities do not keep the reports
287
The methods of abuse include: “blindfoldthat the CAT requires.
ing victims; suspending victims from a ceiling or doorframe with feet
just touching the floor; beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or
other objects; using electrical shocks; and dousing victims with cold
288
water.”
Prisoners, whether men, women, or children, are threatened with and subjected to sexual assault, and the threats include the
289
possibility that family members will be raped.
While Egypt has made many arrests connected to terrorism, the
government has not provided a realistic number of how many people
290
are actually held. The official number is 800, but Amnesty International puts the number far closer to 3000, many of whom have been
291
tortured. Terrorism suspects are tried in military courts where they
292
are denied fair trials.
While there are indications of several deaths
from torture in Egypt, very few of the perpetrators have been brought
to justice, in part, because of insufficient investigations into the inci293
dents.
Prisoners who have been returned to Egypt from other countries
294
suffer the risk of mistreatment and torture.
For example, since
Yemen returned fifteen Egyptian nationals to Egypt, nothing is
295
They have disapknown about their locations and their fates.

284

Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66.
2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—Egypt, supra note 283.
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http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/egy-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Id. (noting that “[i]n February, the Yemeni authorities handed over 15
Egyptian nationals including Dr. Sayyid ‘Abd al-Aziz Imam al-Sharif, Muhammed’
Abd al-Aziz al-Gamal and Uthman al-Samman. The last two had been sentenced to
death in absentia in 1999 and 1994 respectively. The fate and whereabouts of those
returned were not known to AI or, reportedly, to their families and friends.”); see also
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/yem-summary-eng.
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peared from public view into darkness. Based on its human rights record, Egypt’s reputation is black.
296
Syria, although a signatory to the CAT, joins Egypt near the
bottom of the list for the treatment of prisoners. As a leading state
sponsor of terrorism, Syria contravenes many United States policies
297
in the Middle East.
Nonetheless, in the global struggle against the
al-Qaeda brand of terrorism, Syria has been identified as the recipient of at least one terrorism suspect from United States control:
Maher Arar, taken from the immigration context. The Syrian Ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, has acknowledged that
298
Denying that
the United States transferred Arar to Syrian custody.
Arar was mistreated there, the Syrian Ambassador says Arar was released because the Syrians could not link him to any acts of terror299
ism.
Arar may not be the only case of irregular rendition from
American to Syrian control. Reports indicate that forces from the
United States arrested and interrogated a terrorism suspect in Morocco and then secretly transferred him to Syria where he is being
300
held in a tiny underground cell.
Syria’s human rights record is marred by arbitrary arrests, by un301
fair trials, and by torture which has resulted in at least nine deaths.
Even though the Syrian Constitution prohibits any physical or mental
torture, our State Department reveals credible evidence of frequent
302
The methods of abusing prisoners include: “fintorture in Syria.
gers crushed; receiving beatings to their face and legs; having cold
water thrown on them; being forced to stand for long periods of time
during the night; hearing loud screams and beatings of other detainees; being stripped naked in front of others; and being prevented
296

Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66.
See Douglas Jehl, The Mideast Turmoil: Diplomacy; U.S. Avoids Criticism of Raid;
Urges Israel to Use Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at A1 (“. . . the United States has
long called Syria [] a state sponsor of terrorism.”); Christopher Marquis, Syria Said to
Send Arms Again to Lebanon Guerillas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A6 (noting that
Washington lists Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism).
298
CBS News, 60 Minutes II, His Year In Hell, July 15, 2005, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/11/60II/main708164.shtml.
299
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300
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International,
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Human
Rights
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2005,
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/syr-summary-eng (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
This allegedly occurred to Syrian-born German national Muhammad Haydar Zammar. Id.
301
U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Syria, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41732.htm.
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Id.
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303

from praying and growing a beard.”
Other methods include: “administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects
into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim was suspended
from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; bending the detainees
into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body parts; and using a backward-bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the
304
Even children are not spared. Reports indicate
victim’s spine.”
that four school children were beaten with electric cables, had their
heads banged together, and were ordered to strip on the threat of
305
further beating. Such methods are used to extract information and
confessions, and Syrian officials up to the level of brigadier general
306
In general, Syria’s human rights record is
have applied them.
black.
In sum, even without any negative circumstances connected to a
particular rendition, irregular renditions to Uzbekistan, Egypt, and
Syria generally pose problems of compliance with the CAT. The
problems there are so severe that they may not be resolved through
assurances, post-transfer monitoring, or a combination of the two.
The records for these countries are dark enough that disbelief cannot
be suspended. For the time being, these countries should be removed from the list as recipients of irregular renditions from the
United States and other countries. As a final verdict on specific cases,
unless the United States demonstrates some special factors in its favor, such as extensive assurances and extensive monitoring, the renditions of Abu Omar and Mamdouh Habib to Egypt and of Maher
Arar to Syria may not have strictly complied with Article Three of the
CAT. In hindsight, that much seems clear.
C. Gray Areas
Assurances and monitoring are most relevant on renditions to
the second group. Bulgaria is one country in the middle. Bulgaria is
307
a signatory to the CAT.
Some prisoners have reportedly been mistreated in Bulgaria, and some of the mistreatment by law enforce308
ment officials may have crossed into torture.
The police have

303
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beaten criminal suspects during initial interrogations. Two specific
incidents have been reported. Police officers released dogs on Roma
Assen Zarev in an attempt to learn the whereabouts of some other
310
In another interrogation, pomen, and threatened to shoot him.
lice beat Boris Daskalov on the soles of his feet with rubber trun311
Daskacheons, having stuffed a cloth in his mouth to silence him.
lov, it is reported, was handcuffed on his arms and legs and
suspended between two chairs with a wooden stick between his arms
312
The United Nations Committee Against Torture is
and his knees.
concerned about such cases of prisoner mistreatment, particularly
313
the case of Zarev, which may have reached the threshold of torture.
The Zarev and Daskalov incidents, while deplorable, do not suggest
that such treatment is routine or would be the likely fate of someone
rendered to Bulgaria. Based on its human rights record, Bulgaria’s
reputation is neither white nor black.
Problems similar to those in Bulgaria exist in Romania, another
314
country mentioned as a possible site for secret CIA interrogations.
315
Romania ratified the CAT on December 18, 1990.
There are several reports of Romanian law enforcement officials mistreating pris316
oners with some cases crossing into torture. The Romanian prisons
in which the mistreatment has occurred have been described as “in317
human and degrading.”
As in Poland, such degrading conditions
are probably a result of Romania’s limited budget rather than a deliberate effort to degrade prisoners. Inappropriate means of restraints, notably chains and shackles, are a common problem in Ro318
Several female prisoners allege that law enforcement
mania.
319
officials raped them while they were in custody.
Another problem
in Romania is widespread corruption, which affects the judiciary and
320
undermines the media and other organizations. Even so, torture is
309
U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human Rights Practices—
Bulgaria, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41674.htm.
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not routine or prevalent. On balance, Romania’s human rights record is also gray.
Jordan approaches the bottom of the second category, and a
reasonable argument can be made for putting Jordan in the third
321
group. Although Jordan has ratified the CAT, the human rights
violations in Jordan seem worse than in Bulgaria and Romania. Significant to the policy debate, Jordan has been mentioned as a recipient of rendered suspects from the United States and as a behind-the322
scenes ally of the United States in counter-terrorism.
There are substantial allegations of abuse and torture during detention and interrogation in Jordan. Verification of these allegations,
however, has been difficult because prisoners are not provided timely
323
Common methods of interrogation in Jordan
access to counsel.
are “beating, sleep deprivation, extended solitary confinement, and
324
physical suspension.” Many detainees who have allegedly been mistreated and tortured were arrested for terrorism; one suspected ter325
rorist allegedly died in custody from abuse by prison staff.
Worse,
Amnesty International questions the impartiality of official investiga326
Moreover, terrorism suspects may not
tions into these allegations.
receive due process when they appear before the State Security
327
Court, a panel of military judges that handles terrorism cases. As a
result of such factors, Jordan’s human rights record is a dark shade of
gray.

321

Convention Against Torture Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 66.
See John Crewdsen, Suspected CIA Tactics Spread Outrage in EU; Human-Rights
Concerns Arise over ‘Rendition’ of Terrorist Suspects, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2006, at C4. (“Published estimates attributed to unnamed sources put the total number of renditions
since Sept. 11 at 100 and 120, with some suspects known to have been deposited in
Syria, Jordan, and Mexico.”); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons;
Debate Is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up after
9/11, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1 (“These prisoners, some of whom were originally taken to black sites, are delivered to intelligence services in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Afghanistan and other countries, a process sometimes known as ‘rendition.’”);
Ken Silverstein, Jordan Has Complex Bond with the U.S. Close Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
12, 2005, at A3 (“Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate, or GID, has surpassed
Israel’s Mossad as America’s most effective allied counter-terrorism agency in the
Middle East.”).
323
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In sum, even without any negative circumstances connected to a
particular rendition, irregular renditions to Bulgaria, Romania, and
Jordan pose general problems of compliance with the CAT. Of the
three, Jordan has the worst record. In specific cases, these problems
may be resolved through assurances, post-transfer monitoring, or a
combination of the two. These are difficult cases. These are cases
where assurances and monitoring can make a difference.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Irregular renditions, contrary to the opinions of the City Bar,
Human Rights Watch, and others, are possible under American law.
Assurances and monitoring and oversight, if genuine, can make a difference in decreasing the perceived likelihood that a suspect will be
tortured after he is transferred from United States control.
Law and policy do not always coincide. Something can be legal,
even if it is bad policy. Our executive branch, of course, could attempt to be pure by not taking any chances with irregular rendition.
As a matter of policy, the executive branch might render people
through irregular means only to the cleanest of countries. But such a
policy still requires a standard. Even the criminal law standard, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, is not 100% certainty of guilt. Be that as
it may, the United States might render people only when convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the rendered person will neither be
tortured nor treated by cruel, inhuman, or degrading tactics. Such a
policy might make sense for the domestic consensus behind counterterrorism and for convincing the rest of the world to support the
United States. Such a policy helps retake some sort of high ground.
But such a policy, as this Article has demonstrated, takes the United
States beyond its legal obligations under the CAT.
Even a blanket policy against rendition blurs into gray. If officials have doubts about a receiving country and if there is no better
country to take the suspect, the result will be more people detained
in the United States and more people granted political asylum in the
United States. No matter which direction is chosen, there are costs to
a quest for purity; and inertia has its own costs. The experience in
American prisons and in other American detention facilities around
the world has shown that our prisoners are not perfectly safe from
328
mistreatment.
We are not the cleanest of the clean. Whether the
328

See Josh White, Abu Ghraib Dog Tactics Came from Guantanamo, WASH. POST, July
27, 2005, at A14; Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Inquiry Finds Abuses at Guantanamo Bay,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 35; Eric Schmitt, Abuses at Prison Tied to Officers in Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at A1.
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United States renders suspects or keeps them itself, the potential for
abuse always exists. That is the harsh reality to holding people
against their will.
Stepping into the gray, I have shown some ways in which irregular rendition can comply with American law for policymakers who
dare to consider irregular rendition as a tactic in counter-terrorism
and for an executive branch which does not veer toward the sanctimonious. My thesis has not been winks and nods for people who
want to take the gloves off. Instead, my thesis reflects the importance
of abiding by the rule of law while engaged in secret practices. Out
in the open, a more regular process for irregular rendition is possible.
A more regular form of irregular rendition, to be sure, is not the
same as regular rendition or extradition. But a more open process is
far better for a democracy than a program of irregular rendition that
operates completely in the shadows. Irregular rendition is taken into
lighter shades of gray when the United States obtains reasonable assurances from the receiving country and carries out reasonable monitoring and oversight after transfer. That is a sensible direction.
Once the political posturing on irregular rendition has stopped,
the legal analysis is not especially difficult. As with many other topics,
it involves the interpretation of conventions, statutes, and cases. It
involves the reasonable application of facts to standards. The most
difficult task is to preserve American democracy as we fight barbarism
around the globe. That is a task for everyone, and part of a regular
process that should never be extinguished.

